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Hobbes, Schmitt and the Mythological Legitimization of Sovereignty
Michael O'Brien
This thesis explores the role of political mythology in grounding the legitimacy of
sovereign authority, specifically in popular democratic states. It begins with Hobbes,
taking the political theology of Leviathan as foundational to modern Western theories of
sovereign authority and popular identity, also investigating his justifications for a
sovereign control over public confession. The thesis proceeds in the second chapter to a
study of Carl Schmitt's critique ofpolitical theology and of the extra-legal and extra-
rational foundation ofpolitical legitimacy. Schmitt's assessment of contemporary theories
ofpolitical myth is addressed as well. Against the historical background of the
development of political theology and mythology, it is argued in the final chapter that the
identities of populace with people, of people with sovereign, and ofpeoples and
sovereigns with themselves across time, necessarily involves mythological fictions. The
use of such myth-making to legitimize sovereign authority and justify its use is then
applied to the particular case of caring for future generations, by a mythological
overcoming ofpresentisi democratic mandates.
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This thesis is the product of two somewhat distinct threads that I have pursued
over the past two years ofmy studies (and to some degree before). One thread is an
ecological ethics in the form of a responsibility to natural posterity, something which I
have engaged with both theoretically and politically outside of my academic work. In
exploring different theoretical approaches to framing and grounding an ethical
commitment to ecological stewardship, I encountered a literature on rearrangements of
democratic relations aimed at giving more weight to future concerns and the interests of
non-persons.
Another thread is the interrogation of sovereign legitimacy and state power,
spurred by a political concern over the strengthening of the unitary executive under the
Straussian Neo-Conservative movement during the junior Bush administrations. This
pursuit, shared with other students in discussion groups and private conversations, came
to encompass a political theological literature, centred first on Agamben's Homo Sacer
and working backwards through Schmitt, Strauss, Benjamin, Sorel and others. The
Schmittian thread was already picked up via Derrida's Politics ofFriendship following
Dr. Fritsch's seminar on Derrida's politics in the Fall of 2007, and came to be my main
focus. This focus on Schmitt's ideas in turn led back to Hobbes as the originator of the
tradition which I had been pursuing in reverse order (backward both in the sense of
regressing from recent to past, and from concrete event to theoretical origin).
All this to say that the thesis presented here is a reduction and crystallization of
elements in a wider and less defined personal project, and not primarily driven by a
2scholastic engagement with particular historical works as the objects of inquiry. I use my
sources as instances of ideas in a history of development, and frequently use their ideas in
ways which are not strictly faithful to their own finite expressions thereof. I do take care
to be fair and accurate in identifying the essential elements of these sources' contributions
to the tradition of ideas which I am trying to develop, and do not wish to be mistaken
either for having misinterpreted historical sources or for having deliberately marshalled
such writings into alignment with my own project. Because of the wide range ofmaterial
incorporated into this work, there is an equally wide range of relevant work not
addressed. Most apparent among these omissions are the contributions to Schmitt
scholarship by Arendt, Derrida and Mouffe. I would have liked to incorporate these
thinkers, but the volume of sources already used for this thesis is already burdensome
enough, and the integration of some sources, for instance Derrida, would have been a
separate philosophical project in itself.
This project is an investigation into a politics beyond the rational. I don't wish to
oppose the rational and embrace some kind of politics of sentiment or aesthetic will. 1
simply am interested in understanding the limits of political, and particularly public,
rationality as a sufficient and deciding factor in the actions, justifications and self-
understanding of a political community. This began (prior to the formation of the thesis
here presented) with a look at propaganda, deliberate attempts to over-ride the rational
with emotive or existential force. But as a theoretical object of inquiry this is rather
uninteresting, merely an expedient abuse of social psychology. The mythical, or
phantasmal, was far more interesting as it represents a certain form of thought unto itself,
3which persists quite apart from the adequacy of rationality to rational matters. Though the
mythic aspect of political discourse is conceived differently in the different sources I use,
my own sense is as follows: the presentation of the speculative as factual, the
presentation of the potential as realized, and the presentation of the remote as
immediately present. These concretizations are not lies ("there exists some threat X, here
and now, hidden from detection") but rather fictions which present possible worlds as
phenomenologically and psychologically immediate. Thus myth does not obscure or
replace truth, but supplements it.
1 leave moral consideration of the permissibility ofusing myth to shape politics to
the very end, not wishing to cloud an already cloudy issue in mid-discussion. My primary
task is to show where these ideas take form, and where they may lead, though not without
a complete obliviousness to the ethical concerns raised by any but the most abstract
political investigation (and even then...). I hope this survey of historical ideas, along with
my own perspective and argument, proves informative and interesting to the reader, at
best a helpful contribution to the discussion of these issues and at least bearable.
4Chapter 1
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate Hobbes' position on the authority,
and the duty, of sovereign powers to engage in mythological discourse as part of their
stewardship of the popular good. I will first explain why Hobbes is a necessary thinker to
the project of this thesis, and also clarify what parts of Hobbes' thought I think can be
applied as universal points ofpolitical relevance, versus which parts may be discarded or
modified in adapting his thinking to more contemporary circumstances. I wish to show
that the unyielding absolutism of Hobbes need not be followed in practice, though his .
analyses of the problems of human competition and co-operation, which leads him to
absolutism as the unavoidable final prescription for order, cannot be disregarded in any
discussion of the question "how are states made, and preserved?". This embracing of
absolutism is understandable as a response to the bloodshed brought on by factional
conflict; shared power arrangements will always contain the possibility of conflicting
claims to primacy, or for a right to greater shares of power than those originally agreed
upon. And the rationale for a division of powers and relations among such divisions is
always subject to reinterpretation. But to embrace an absolute unity of power, invested in
a single person (natural or legal), is a fundamental rejection of openness and
accountability that, while perhaps seemingly reasonable in the wake of civil war, is not
tenable morally or politically, pace Hobbes. His granting of complete doxastic control to
the sovereign, for the enforcement of public credence in such absolutist notions of right,
is consequently also untenable, on balance. But insofar as the conditions which Hobbes
sought to preclude remain a danger to the common wealth and security, the spirit and
5reasons ofhis prescriptions retain a relevance to all politics.
The central question of my thesis is whether the construction ofmythological
narratives of the future of a political collectivity, such as a state or people, is a necessary
part of legitimizing a program of action to the person ofthat collectivity. Beginning with
Schmitt and his analysis of the political, the literature quickly led to Hobbes as the
originator of the questions surrounding such issues of legitimacy and efficacy ofpower;
the beginning of "political theology" in its currently recognized form is to be found in his
transformation and inversion of the sovereign's religious role. By this I mean that the
scriptural and philosophical arguments for the sovereign's rights over both church and
state not only bestow on the sovereign a theologically derived authority, but also an
authority which is framed in, and has decisional rights over, theological concepts. Thus I
begin with his thinking on matters of public doctrine and the duties of providential
guidance, as they constitute the primal source of the western political traditions of
accommodating public good with exclusionary concentration of authority.
In addition to referring to Hobbes as an originating point for the ideas addressed
in this work, I also seriously take up some of his positions as not only historically
important, but enduringly valid and applicable positions that may still be taken up by
people dealing with political questions outside of the particular setting of Hobbes' time.
That is to say, Hobbes' thought is valuable not only as an influential example of one
moment of thinking on these issues, to be read as a key to the genealogy of persisting
ideas; much of his work is still very much alive, owing to his success in perceiving
inevitable conflicts between duties, interests, and tendencies that are at play in any
6political situation. These essential elements ofhis philosophy can be applied to
contemporary and even future questions so long as it still makes sense to think of states
and peoples, and perhaps even beyond that horizon of possible arrangements of life.1
Of the essential elements of Hobbes' thought, I would identify the problems of
assigning deciding authority and defending the indivisibility of sovereign authority as
prime parts, followed by negotiating the tension between assurances of freedom and of
security. The recognition of a sovereign duty over and above responsibility to popular
demand is another element that continues to inform how political questions are framed,
despite the ubiquity of democracy in the West; the essentially paradoxical construction of
modern constitutional democracy is no more removed from this unresolved conflict
(between inter-subjective and objective duties of care for public well-being) than were
the monarchical politics of Hobbes' time.
There are of course other sides of Hobbes' thought that seem incompatible, or at
least contrary, to the political values which are now taken as sacrosanct. Ours is an age
and a culture well-settled on the supremacy ofpublic will, democratically expressed, over
1 Hobbes' definition of commonwealth, though stark, still captures the essence of government. See De
Cive, p. 73: "A COMMONWEALTH, then, (to define it) is oneperson, whose will, by the agreement of
several men, is to be taken as the will of them all; to make use of their strength and resources for the
common peace and defence."
He later adds the notion of authority, in the sense ofbeing author of a will made into action, in his
definition found in Leviathan:
"[T]he Essence of the Commonwealth [...] is One Person, ofwhose acts
a great Multitude, by mutuali Covenants one with another, have made
themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use the strength and
means ofthem all, as he shall think expedient, for their Peace and
Common Defence.
And he that carryeth this Person, is called SOVERA1GNE,
and said to have Soveraigne Power, and every one besides, his
SUBJECT." (121)
7the sovereign prerogative invested in one, or few, agents; it may well be desirable to
discard elements ofHobbes' analysis and prescription which are irretrievably anti-
democratic and absolutist in their arrogation ofunyielding unitary and irreproachable
power to a sovereign monarch or assembly. But there is also something of value in
thinking beyond the horizons of contemporary democratic fundamentalism, if only to
better situate and understand the place of the democratically committed solutions to the
problems illustrated by Hobbes. The final end of this thesis is to defend mythologically
narrated state programs, and to do so in part on the basis of Hobbes' and Schmitt's (and
others') applicability to a world which, firstly, still abides by the rules ofnecessity they
identified, and, secondly, has juridical/political/social features which are compatible with
our picture of a morally defensible and desirable politics. To that end, an account of
which seemingly inadmissible parts of Hobbes (and later of Schmitt) can be assigned a
merely historically determined place, and which are organic to the ideas which we desire
to continue applying to our politics, is necessary.
Hobbes' view of democracy is dim, but not so much so that a Hobbesian politics
is necessarily undemocratic.2 That dim view in part comes from the proximity which
democratic sentiments can have to anarchic designs, if the importance of control is
forgotten.3 He does, at times, suggest that democracy is adequate to the task of governing
2 To the question "Why discuss democracy in Hobbes, then?", I reply; While Hobbes is not as explicitly
focused on theories of democracy as later moderns, his conceptions of statehood and sovereignty
framed later democratic theory as desiderata, even criteria, of a strong democratic body. The challenge
of proving that a political body, with such empirical obstacles to democratic character as unitary
authority and absolute sovereignty, can nonetheless be conceived of as "of the people" calls upon the
kind of mythological thinking which I seek to explore.
3 "For if we could suppose a great Multitude of men to consent in the observation of Justice, and other
Lawes ofNature, without a common Power to keep them all in awe; we might as well suppose all Man-
kind to do the same; and then neither would be, nor need to be any Civili Government, or
8a commonwealth, with a few provisos. In De Cive and Leviathan he cites several
problems with the functioning ofmass government; it is clear from his definition of
democracy and his criticisms of its functioning that he understands this system of
government as closer to what was practised in Athens than what passes for democracy in
the present West. It is also clear that from De Cive to Leviathan his conception of
democracy becomes more representational and less participatory. He defines democracy
in De Cive thus: "The first [kind of commonwealth] is where sovereign power lies with
an Assembly in which any citizen has the right to vote; it is called DEMOCRACY"4. The
right to vote is not simply a right to elect representatives to decide on matters of
legislation and state affairs, but rather a right to vote on those decisions themselves. This
is clear from Hobbes' criticisms mentioned above, which focus on the burden of
representing an overwhelming volume of individual views and interests in effective and
timely debate. Because the exigencies of discussion require that the mass ofpeople
delegate discussion to assemblies of select representatives, rather than debating amongst
the whole of the people themselves, Hobbes faults democracy for creating large
assemblies which fall prey to sociological and mass-psychological faults rather than
maintaining a purposive and rational focus on the facts of matters in debate. In addition to
the burdens of creating an assembly in which all have adequate knowledge of the broad
and complex matters involved in questions of state, and to the risks of having a debate
perverted by the emotional power of eloquent speech among a crowd, the large
representative assemblies which in democracies function as a substitute for direct
Commonwealth at all; because there would be peace without subjection." Leviathan, 1 1 8
4 De Cive, 91
9presentation "[t]he third reason why deliberation in a large assembly is unprofitable is
that it is a source offactions in the commonwealth, andfactions are the source of sedition
and civil war."5 As with all ofHobbes' reasoning, the background of any evaluation of
politics is the threat of discord and eventually war, and democracy seems to fail because,
being premised on the popular sovereignty invested in the popular body, it requires
representation by bodies so populous as to be replicate the conflicting interest groups,
called factions, which rational government was supposed to supplant.
Hobbes does qualify that indictment, however. Again in De Cive, he writes:
These disadvantages found in the deliberations of large
assemblies prove that Monarchy is better than Democracy
in so far as in Democracy questions of great importance are
more often passed to such [large] assemblies for discussion
than in a Monarchy [...] But if in a Democracy the people
should choose to concentrate deliberations about war and
peace and legislation in the hands ofjust one man or of a
very small number of men, and were happy to appoint
magistrates and public ministers, i.e. to have authority
without executive power, then it must be admitted that
Democracy and Monarchy would be equal in this matter.6
Here Hobbes seems to be open to a democratic government if it can find
5 De Cive, 123
6 Ibid., 124-125
10
acceptable ways of executing a popular sovereignty in practice that steer clear of the risks
of discord and sedition. And it seems that the kind of democratic government now
ubiquitous in what may be called the free world is much like the compromise described
above; the people reserve their sovereignty and so remain authors of the actions of state,
but delegate the power to decide on those actions to a singular or small number of agents
for practical reasons. But the sense in which the democratic body of the people retains
authority is more abstract and passive than what is considered integral to democracy
following the developments in liberal thought post-Hobbes. This should be taken together
with the fact that modern democracies, with a professionalization and mechanization of
function, are in functional terms not much different than what Hobbes describes as
Aristocracy, that is, a system where sovereignty lies in an Assembly where some few, not
all, of the people have a right to vote (on decisions, not on the identity of deciders).
Hobbes' aristocratic "democracy", representative but not directly participatory, is in this
view not so far from the present political scene, though he is strident in defending the
deficit between democratic character and democratic practice.
This strange relation to sovereignty, preserved "theologico-politically" by a
people even in their legal and functional submission to absolute representatives, is one
point of entry into the mythological elements of Hobbes' politics. How is it that the
people are authors of actions taken by a sovereign against whom they bear no rights, nor
hold competing power? This question is answered by the identity of "people" in Hobbes'
7 Richard Tuck notes this in his introduction to Leviathan: "Hobbes consistently endorsed [a] view which
is fundamental to modern democratic politics, which is that it makes sense to say that sovereignty can
lie with a people even when they do not directly exercise it." xxxvii
8 See quote from De Cive, p. 124-125 on preceding page.
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work, as distinguished from multitude. The frontispiece ofLeviathan shows the sovereign
as composed, from the neck down, of innumerable human bodies, a visual metaphor for
the organic, corporeal schema of the commonwealth. The sovereign is not simply one of
a number ofpersons, selected out ofthat number to act on their behalf, by weighing the
desires and wills of others and enacting the balance ofthat measure, no more than the
brain consults with the other cells in a body to execute their combined wills. He (or she,
or even they) is rather authorized by the covenant by which people surrender their
sovereignty against one another in a desire to exit the state ofnature. The monarch, or
assembly, is alone sovereign, because that sovereignty was not newly created out ofbits
of the sovereign right of each member in a commonwealth, but rather wholly transferred
from those persons, and as such is no longer theirs to exercise. David Dyzenhaus notes
the (to put it uncharitably) ad-hoc employment and transitory nature ofpopular
sovereignty's role in Hobbes' grounding of sovereign right; in the original scheme of
rational individuals authorizing a sovereign power for their protection, "Hobbes builds
his theory ofpublic order on an appeal to individual rationality, but then seeks to preclude
individual rationality from any significant place in sustaining and recreating public
order."9
The identity of the will of the governed with that of the governing person, and of
the individual human beings of a commonwealth with one another as public person, is the
kind of identity that could be called abstract, mythological, or, to borrow a term from
Derrida and the deconstructionist literature, phantasmal. The phantasm of indivisible
sovereignty, as discussed by Michael Naas in "Comme si, comme ça ", is presented in the
9 Dyzenhaus, "Now the Machine Runs Itself, 6.
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form of "this is so", rather than merely a theoretical exercise of "consider this as ifit were
so"10. The phantasm, then, is a conception of sovereignty, and fixable identity, that is
insulated from critique and deconstruction by its location in a fictional space; it is not
derivative of facts, nor is it parasitic on a theoretical representation of fact. It rather
claims for itself a ground beyond historical, sociological or other such plainly factual
conditions, sometimes in the theological realm of divinity, sometimes in the
transcendental realm of right.11 In fact, Hobbes' Leviathan (the state, as well as the
treatise) fits halfway into Naas' characterization of phantasms: first, that it assumes self-
coincidence, a self-identity that is indivisible and inviolable; second, that it holds itself
sovereign because it can act from this self-sameness; third, it reflects a supposed natural
and organic corporeality of a people, not the product of mechanism or artifact, and in this
sense pure of conditioning; fourth, that it appears ahistorical (though the Leviathan does
have a genesis in history, its legitimizing ground is more theological than historical, and
the founding transfer of sovereignty is more a conceptual stage of development than an
identifiable historical event); and fifth, that it tries to pass off "historically conditioned
performative fiction as a constative or objective observation".12 Schmitt argues that the
Leviathan fails precisely because it is not what it claims to be on the third point ofNaas'
account, non-mechanicity. He writes "The intrinsic logic of the manmade artificial
product 'state' does not culminate in a person but in a machine"; and "The sovereign-
representative person is only the soul of the "huge man' state [...] As a totality, the state is
10 "The power of sovereignty lies precisely in in this elision of a fictional origin and its real effects, the
elision of a performative fiction (an "as if, a commesi) and a constative observation (an "as this" or a




body and soul, a homo artificialis, and, as such, a machine." 13
This sense ofphantasm, the supplement of or substitution for a factual,
conditioned account of the world by a fiction conjured outside of conditioning
circumstances or developed from prior unconditional sovereignties, is very close to the
sense in which I employ the word "myth" in this paper. The mythological mode of
discourse, of creating and presenting the fictional along with the factual, is precisely the
mode which I will argue is necessary to articulate, with authority and efficacy in
governance, the unrevealed world of the future which must be anticipated when deciding
a course in the present. This first point, that it is only a phantasmal unity which binds the
represented amongst themselves, and binds them to the sovereign in a just subjection,
establishes Hobbes1 thought as dealing with myth at least performatively. While Hobbes
is quite explicit in presenting the state Leviathan as a metaphor, his thorough-going
application ofthat metaphor goes beyond a mere illustration of concepts and into the
leverage ofmythic appeal for rhetorical force.
The difference between a People and a crowd, between natural multiplicity and a
fictive unity ofnatural persons inhabiting a commonwealth, is of great importance, firstly
because of the role such conceptions play in Hobbes' claims about the sovereign
representative's legitimacy, and secondly in illustrating the political-mythical side of his
thinking. On the first count, Hobbes cites a deficient understanding of the distinction
between crowds and peoples as a cause of dissolution in commonwealths, clarifying "A
people is a single entity with a single will; you can attribute an act to it. None of this can
be said of a crowd. In every commonwealth the People Reigns; for even in Monarchies
13 The Leviathan in the State Theory ofThomas Hobbes, 34
14
the People exercises power; for the people wills through the will of one man."14 And
earlier "A Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are by one man, or one
Person, Represented [...] For it is the Unity of the Représenter, not the Unity of the
Represented, that maketh the Person One."i5 I include yet another passage which clearly
states Hobbes' view on the creation of a civil unitary person:
The only way to erect such a Common Power [...] is, to
conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or
upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills,
by plurality of voices, unto one Will: which is as much as
to say, every one to owne, and acknowledge himselfe to be
Author of whatsoever he that so beareth their Person, shall
Act, or cause to be Acted [...] This is more than Consent, or
Concord; it is a reali Unitie of them all, in one and the same
Person [...] This is the Generation ofthat great
LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speak more reverently) ofthat
Mortali God, to which wee owe under the Immortal God,
our peace and defence.16
Clearly the will of which Hobbes writes is not the same as opinion or evaluative
idea, in the sense of having content or being defined by intention towards a particular





public will for Hobbes is an authorizing power, a capacity which can be surrendered to
and thus exercised by the sovereign representative of those willing subjects. The public
will may be manifested by sovereign action, or spontaneously by the multitude, with
observable sociological and material effects; yet, as conceived by Hobbes (and many
others) it is a supra-physical force, a transferable quality ofpersons, that is posited to
exist and to be amenable to certain operations of displacement and consolidation, and no
less opaque to empirical detection than the soul. To posit such a foundation for legitimacy
is to deal in phantasm, and to proclaim it as a fact among other natural and historical facts
is to engage in the mythic mode as I have described it.
The task of explaining how will can be infused from a multitude into a person is
one challenge to a theory such as Hobbes'; another challenge is to describe how the right
to wield sovereign authority, once invested in a person (monarch or assembly) can then
be transferred to another such person. Thus, the problems of succession loom in Hobbes'
theory, for this theoretical reason and also because of the more practical concerns of the
risk and uncertainty engendered by any change of regime. As the artificial body of the
Leviathan requires a structure to function, it also requires a process of revitalization to
persist, thus an account of succession is required to keep the Leviathan from dissolving
each time the homunculus guiding its actions succumbs to mortality. In De Cive Hobbes
believes that succession is only a problem for Monarchy, because in a democracy
"sovereignty rests with the same person so long as there are citizens. For a people has no
successor" and "Similarly in an Aristocracy, when one of the optimates dies, another is
appointed by the rest to take his place, hence there is no succession", nor is succession an
16
issue in non-absolute monarchies because "Monarchs who exercise sovereign power only
for a time are not actually monarchs but ministers of the commonwealth."17 In Leviathan,
however, Hobbes extends the scope of the problem of succession to all forms of
commonwealth, as "the matter being mortali, so that not onely Monarchs, but also whole
Assemblies dy, it is necessary for the conservation of the peace of men, that that as there
was order taken for an Artificiali Man, so there be order also taken, for an Artificiali
Eternity to life [...] which men call the Right to Succession."™
That the individual wills of persons in society must, for the sake of the security of
all, be taken up in a person, and further that the right to bear this person must be
transferable to some particular natural person or group of persons, are not self-evident
facts, but rather ideas posited in the justification of sovereign right. The reason they are
for Hobbes not idle speculations but laws, of the order of natural and divine laws in their
normative and descriptive force, is that they are answers to a question of survival. He
explicitly states at every turn that the preservation ofpeace is the justification for each
power granted to the sovereign, and for the rules by which that sovereign power is
exercised.19 The initial coming-together of sovereign individuals and surrendering of
17 DeCive, 112
18 Leviathan, 135
19 It is crucial to understanding the scope of Hobbes' project that "peace" be understood as much broader
than the absence ofphysical conflict. Much of the state ofnature's agony is not the product of injuries of
the flesh, but rather the mental anguish of uncertainty and fear. Protection from "war" is thus an
immersive project to ensure felicitous conditions for the psychological and social health of the
commonwealth, and material prosperity besides (though wealth has its own dangers to harmonious
commonwealth). The following passage summarizes nicely Hobbes view of war's relation to peace:
Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a
common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition
which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against
every man. For WARRE, consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of
fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is
17
rights to a representative20, the absolute power of the representative21 and the rules of
succession for these representatives, both are impositions on freedom for the sake of
security. An even more thorough suppression of individual freedom, one might say a pre-
emptive manoeuvre against such freedom, is to be found in Hobbes' prescriptions for
public discourse and doctrine.
Beyond his own employment of myth to illustrate and justify his account of
sovereignty, Hobbes' also writes about myth itself, both in the sense of religious doctrine,
and in the sense of projections of the future. In taking examples from his discussion of
religious doctrine, one must be mindful of a question about Hobbes' religious attitudes; it
remains unclear to what degree he could be described as faithful or religious himself. He
does pay a great deal of lip service to scriptural authority in that he spends much of
Leviathan citing the Old Testament and constructing biblically-grounded arguments. But
he also dismisses much of the divinity of religion, subjecting it to a naturalist, historicist
reinterpretation. This raises the question of whether his employment of religion is done in
good faith, that is, in giving due place to mystery, reverence, etc. in the public life of the
state; or rather, if it is merely a skilful manipulation of religious language in service to his
absolutist state theory. In Richard Tuck's introduction to the Cambridge edition of
Leviathan, he notes that the majority of historians who have scrutinized the evidence of
sufficiently known [...] So the nature ofWar, consisteth not in actuall
fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there
is no assurance to the contrary. Ibid., 88-89
20 "The finali Cause, End, or Designe of men, (who naturally love Liberty, and Dominion over others,) in
the introduction of restraint upon themselves, (in which wee see them live in Commonwealths,) is the
foresight of their own preservation and ofa more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting
themselves out from that miserable condition of Warre [...]" Ibid., 117
2 1 "All the duties of sovereigns are implicit in this one phrase: the safety ofthepeople is the supreme law."
DeCive, 143
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Hobbes' motives in advocating a robust control of religious doctrine by the sovereign
have concluded it was done primarily in the interests of control and not enlightenment.
Paul Dumouchel's take on Hobbes' religious advice is even harsher, charging that:
His solution [to conflicts between religious and civil laws]
consists in asserting that both laws rarely contradict each
other and that when they do, the subject patiently endure
the harsh rule of his temporal master. Such a 'solution' has
often suggested that Hobbes could not be sincere, that he
had no understanding of religion and considered it little
more than a bothersome complication in his purely rational
scheme of politics. His writings on religion [are] but
(largely unsuccessful) attempts to appease the anger of
querulous clerics.
Whether or not Hobbes really did revere the Christian doctrine, or accord true
piety to religious faith, it seems clear that he maintained a skeptical outlook on the
publicity of revealed or absolute truth. "No Discourse whatsoever", he wrote, "can End in
absolute knowledge of Fact, past, or to come."24 He also believed that discourse never
reached beyond the exchange of human marks for human ideas, and as such all credence
given to things publicly expressed amounted to a faith in a human source. To use a
religious example:
22 Leviathan, xlii
23 Dumouchel, "Hobbes and Secularization", 39-40
24 Leviathan, 47
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... when wee Believe that the Scriptures are the word of
God, having no immediate revelation from God himselfe,
our Beleefe, Faith, and Trust is in the Church; whose word
we take, and acquiesce therein [...] So that it is evident, that
whatsoever we believe, upon no other reason, then what is
drawn from authority of men onely, and their writings;
whether they be sent from God or not, is Faith in men
onely.25
Thus Hobbes shows that faith in human authority under-girds faith in anything
that is reported but not seen; as suitable as such a basis is for religion, so is it for the
theology of sovereign power. And since religious pronouncements rest on human
authority, the highest human authority should, by rights, also claim to itself the right to
determine religious truth, which Hobbes of course advocates.
The public faith is a source of great power and danger, as it can lead to factional
disputes on points of disagreement, and create a rival basis of authority against the civil
sovereign. The power of determining public belief is also appealing to sovereign control
because it is bloodless when properly applied (i.e. not by forceful punishment of
heterodoxy); the smooth and peaceful life of the commonwealth is well served by a
sovereign authority which guides the populace to concord and peace through shared
beliefs and values. Schmitt notes the prominence, equal to that given to symbols of
25 Ibid., 49
26 "[I]t is annexed to the Sovereignty, to be Judge of what Opinions and Doctrines are averse, and what
armed force, given to symbols of religious doctrine and authority on the frontispiece of
Leviathan, remarking "The important realization that ideas and distinctions are political
weapons, in fact, specific weapons of wielding 'indirect' power, was made evident on the
first page of the book." The distaste which Hobbes felt towards violence (which may be
fairly surmised, I believe, from his flight from political trouble during his life, his near-
obsession with the avoidance of war, and the rather humanitarian bent of much of his
writing ) is one explanation for emphasizing the power of the pulpit, and of the
university chair, over that of the sword in preserving peace and happiness. Another
explanation is its effectiveness. As later advocates and critics of totalitarian government
have noted, the control of thought, provided that an authority has the power and ubiquity
to effect such control persistently and seamlessly, is far more effective than the control of
action stemming from thought.
In contrast to the typical mould of totalitarian social engineering (at least in
caricature), Hobbes did not seek to produce unthinking subjects. He was in fact quite
conducing to Peace; be trusted withall, in speaking to Multitudes ofpeople; and who shall examine the
Doctrines of all bookes before they be published. For the Actions ofMen proceed from their Opinions;
and in the well governing of Opinions, consisteth the well governing of men's Actions, in order to their
Peace, and Concord." (Ibid., 124)
27 Leviathan in the State Theory ofHobbes, 1 8
28 For instance, this passage from Leviathan:
"The multitude ofpoor, and yet strong people still increasing, they are to be transplanted into Countries
not sufficiently inhabited: where neverthelesse, they are not to exterminate those they find there; but
constrain them to inhabit closer together, and not range a great deal of ground, to snatch what they find;
but to court each little Plot with art and labour, to give them their sustenance in due season." (239)
(It concludes, however, " And then when al the world is overchargd with Inhabitants, then the last
remedy of all is Warre; which provideth for every man, by Victory, or Death." (Ibid.) War and death are
never far from Hobbes view, even in his warmer moments.)
29 A literary example is the Party dictionary in George Orwell's 1984, on which the narrator notes "The
greatest difficulty facing the compilers of the Newspeak dictionary was not to invent new words, but,
having invented them, to make sure what they meant." (Orwell, 1984, 304). Likewise, determining the
meaning of words already in use is a prerogative both for Hobbesian science and for Hobbesian politics,
as shown here: "The Use and End of Reason, is not the finding of the summe , and the truth of one, or a
few consequences, remote from first definitions and settled significations of names; but to begin at
these; and proceed from one consequence to another." (Leviathan, 33)
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passionate about improving the thinking of the public, by the application of scientific
thinking to social discourse and the removal of superstition (it bears mentioning that
Hobbes distinguishes between religion and superstition thus: "Feare ofpower invisible,
feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publiquely allowed, RELIGION; not
allowed, SUPERSTITION.")30 The eradication of superstition therefore amounts to the
eradication of heterodoxy on fearful attitudes concerning matters invisible, and thus leads
quite directly to a mandate for religious orthodoxy, or at least uniform profession of faith,
under sovereign doctrinal authority of course). Much of the early part of Leviathan is
dedicated to showing how thinking is done properly ', and how it is done improperly, and
the consequences of good and bad reasoning. The correct instrumental use of reason by
subjects is quite compatible with Hobbes' sovereign, even beneficial to his program, as it
removes random variations in thought that can arise from the erroneous use of common
facts, even if those facts are of a uniform public stock. So long as they think rígbúyfrom
the rightpremises then few chances for discord, factional dissolution and war exist. The
sovereign therefore can encourage brightness ofmind, but limit the depth to which
publicly tolerated critique can reach. Ofprimary importance is the teaching of sovereign
right, to secure the authority by which all other actions proceed and avoid the necessity to
enforce authority by violence should it be contested. From Leviathan:
[I]t is against his Duty, to let the people be ignorant, or mis-
30 Leviathan, 42
3 ] "And therefore, when the Discourse is put into Speech, and begins with the Definitions of Words, and
proceeds by Connexion of the same into generali Affirmations, and of these again into Syllogismes; the
End or last summe is called the Conclusion; and the thought of the mind by it signified, is that
conditional Knowledge, or Knowledge of the consequences of words, which is commonly called
SCIENCE." (Ibid., 47-48)
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informed of the grounds, and reasons of those his essentiall
Rights; because thereby men are easie to be seduced, and
drawn to resist him, when the Commonwealth shal require
their use and exercise [...] And the grounds of these Rights,
have the rather need to be diligently, and truly taught;
because they cannot be maintained by any Civili Law, or
terrour of legall punishment.32
Because these doctrines are so important to public security, Hobbes makes their
dissemination a matter necessarily of state authority, arguing "They also that have
authority to teach, or to enable others to teach the people their duty to Soveraign Power,
and instruct them in the knowledge of what is just [...] are Publique Ministers: Ministers,
in that they doe it not by their own Authority, but by anothers; and Publique, because they
doe it (or should doe it) by no Authority, but that of the Soveraign."33 They that do not
have authority to teach such matters, but do so anyway, are suspect as pretenders to that
original authority of which approved teachers are ministers. All persons trying to
convince others to accept their reasoning should be scrutinized with skeptical and careful
reasoning, except for the sovereign him- or herself (or itself, in the case of an assembly).
Hobbes' argument for this exception is as follows:
For he that pretends to teach men the way of so great




reign over them; which is a thing, that all men naturally
desire, and is therefore worthy to be suspected ofAmbition
and Imposture; and consequently, ought to be examined,
and tryed by every man, before hee yeeld them obedience;
unlesse he have yeelded it them already, in the institution of
a Common-wealth; as when the Prophet is the Civili
Soveraign, or by the Civil Soveraign Authorized.34
The power of instruction is so great that it is to be jealously guarded. But the
sovereign's concern also extends to ensuring that the contents of doctrines beyond those
of his/her/its legitimacy are also conducive to the security and peace of the
commonwealth. The starkness of the sovereign's claim to absolute authority, especially
over the public profession of truth, is jarring, but it should not obscure the beneficent role
that was envisioned for a public discourse so controlled. The creation of a society
educated in its own self-care is a primary goal of this doctrinal control (in addition to the
goal ofpeace though stability that all Hobbesian precepts serve at least indirectly), as
Hobbes urges "the procuration of the safety ofthepeople [...] also all other Contentments
of life [...] is intended should be done, not by care applyed to Individualls, further than
their protection from injuries [...] but by a generali Providence, contained in publique
Instruction, bothe of Doctrine, and Example [~.]"35




more, than by the persecution of noxious ones, can fairly be seen as an educational, civic
and social program covering all of public life, not merely a propaganda program to
prevent dissent. Hobbes makes room for dissent in the private sphere, distinguishing
between public profession and private conscience, much like the distinction between the
multitude and the people. Private heterodoxy is not a great threat, because the multitude
is already heterogeneous by nature, and as private persons subjects may harbour whatever
beliefs they wish. But the heterodoxy ofpublic confession threatens the People,
conceived as that entity formed by the persons of the multitude united; not simply in the
sense that heterodox views may lead to conflict that injures individuals among the
People, but also in the sense that the People itself disappears back into the multitude as
their unified public person begins to be differentiated. Hobbes therefore distinguishes
between:
a Publique, and a Private Worship. Publique, is the
Worship that a Common-wealth performeth, as one Person.
Private, is that which a Private person exhibiteth. Publique,
in respect of the whole Common-wealth, is Free36; but in
respect of Particular men it is not so. Private, is in secret
Free; but in the sight of the multitude, it is never without
some Restraint, either from the Lawes, or from the Opinion
ofmen; which is contrary to the nature of Liberty.37
36 i.e. free from the authority of other commonwealths
37 Leviathan, 239
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Given that Hobbes seems to lack a religious fervour, except in employing
theology to support civil doctrine, it seems entirely likely that the private worshipper
really is to be left to his or her own conscience, unmolested by doctrinal fundamentalists.
To insist on private conformity, on pain ofpunishment, to a standard that most, being
individuals, would fail to attain, would be to invite the kind of anxiety and defensive
circumspection that Hobbes identifies with the state ofnature. The liberal approach to
private belief, and its simple separation from public confession, suggest that Hobbes is
not a religious but rather a civil fundamentalist; by advocating the enlistment of scriptural
and ecclesiastical (not to mention also academic) authority into the service of sovereign
legitimization, he argued for the use of a transcendental supplement to legal or historical
accounts of legitimacy. To a significant degree this is simply strategic and pragmatic; the
role of religion in political and civil life in Hobbes' time was so large as to require either
exploitation or containment by a sovereign power wishing to claim and exercise
authority. But beyond such practical considerations, Hobbes' intertwining of sovereign
power with a theological account of right erects a mythical narrative of the just state,
rooted in an ahistorical past. The adherence to formal relations of sovereign right and
subject obedience, modelled on relations between divinity and humanity, is so strong that
Hobbes proscribes rebellion against an infidel sovereign by Christians subject to him as
not only uncivil but also sinful.
I hope to have shown thus far Hobbes' role in grounding the project of this thesis,
by demonstrating his indispensability to thinking of the instrumental and moral
38 "And when the Civili Soveraign is an Infidel, every one of his own Subjects that resisteth him, sinneth
against the Laws of God (for such are the Laws ofNature,) and rejecteth the counsell of the Apostles,
that admonisheth all Christians to obey their Princes..." Ibid., 414
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necessities of states, and the importance of extra-rational doctrine to civil discourse. In
Hobbes' case the employment of the mythic mode is subtle and latent, using parallels
between religious and civil relations ofpower to legitimize authority, rather than
explicitly appealing to mythical or religious content. I would like to add another
dimension in which Hobbes' contribution to political theory serves the argument to be
defended in this work, which is the temporal extension of the sovereign's realm of
responsibility. In Hobbes' writings, there is not a great deal of commitment to working
within democratic settings; he seems to drift between benign acceptance of democratic
validity (with provisos) and a more wary skepticism about its stability as compared to his
preferred monarchical scheme. As such, the balancing of, on the one hand, the demands
of an assembly of the living population of a commonwealth, and on the other hand, the
objective and generationally unbiased assessment of sovereign responsibility, is not of
any great importance to sovereign legitimacy. For the Leviathan, the demands of the
multitude are a concern for competent management of the commonwealth's internal
affairs, but not a legitimate claim against the sovereign's prerogative. The absolute and
divinely ordained authority of the sovereign is ground enough to justify decisions
favouring the historically extended interest of the commonwealth over the exigencies of
any present moment. Hobbes also ascribes anxiety to humankind as a primal condition of
its existence, "For being assured that there be causes of all things that have arrived
hitherto, or shall arrive hereafter; it is impossible for a man, who continually
endeavoureth to secure himselfe against the evil he feares, and procure the good he
desireth, no to be in a perpetuali solicitude of the time to come [~.]".39
39 Ibid., 76
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There are some indications however, which point to other, less totalizing grounds
of support in Hobbes for a citation of other-timely responsibilities for political decisions.
First, and rather plainly, I cite a passage in De Cive wherein Hobbes claims that the
sovereign "has done his duty ifhe has made every effort, to provide by sound measures
for the welfare of as many of them as possible for as long as possible [...]".4° If we take
seriously the eternal life of the sovereign personified (noting that this idea is developed in
a later work than the source of the preceding quote), as granted by the fictive unity of all
will and authority in the sovereign and the succession thereof, then clearly we should
interpret the duty to "as many" for "as long" as possible to be an obligation to the
perpetual welfare of the commonwealth, and as such argue for a strong measure of
restraint and charity in balancing present concerns against likely future interests.
In another excerpt from De Cive, Hobbes warns against the doctrine of an
absolute right to private property:
The seventh doctrine inimical to commonwealths is that
individual citizens have absolute Dominion over their
possessions; i.e. such aproperty in them as excludes the
right of all their fellow-citizens and of the commonwealth
itself to those things [...] Your Dominion therefore and your
property are as extensive as the commonwealth wishes and
lasts for just so long; as in a family, the father determines
which goods are theproperty of the children and for how
40 De Cive, 143
long.41
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Here there are two important ideas at work. First, a refutation of the right to
deprive the commonwealth, both as a whole and as individuals, of the use ofproperty
privately held. This right is not only contrary to Hobbes' absolute right of sovereigns, but
also to the basic logic of commonwealth, insofar as it totally denies (in principle) any
claim laid on individually held property by that commonwealth which makes security of
property possible. Thus the institution ofproperty rights protects the property of subjects
against appropriation by other subjects, but not by the sovereign, who may deem such
appropriation necessary to the protection of the commonwealth . As for the responsibility
of the sovereign to future instantiations of the commonwealth, the denial of private
dominion over possessions removes an important barrier to a doctrine of cross-
generational justice and provision of welfare.
The second idea at work in the cited passage is the strong paternalism and
comparison of the sovereign to a father assigning possession of goods to his children.
Again assuming a timeless sovereign composed of a succession of impersonations, the
sovereign's determination of what goods are to be enjoyed by what generation, what
opportunities of enjoyment or exploitation are enacted or foregone at whose expense, are
analogous to the father's role. Two important differences are, first, that the father's natural
dominion over his children derives from the power of generation, in contrast to the
sovereign's right by institution, and second, that in a commonwealth the generations do
not proceed by a clear serial succession as in natural families, complicating the renewal
41 Ibid., 136
of the social contract with new generations.
The power held by previous instantiations of a commonwealth over those which
follow can be analogous to the relation of an imperial nation to a colony, if the
commonwealth embarks on massive irreversible changes or structural and institutional
entrenchments which bind the choices of the future. Hobbes writes that when a people is
ruled "by an Assembly, not of their own choosing, 'tis a Monarchy; not of One man, over
another man; but of one people, over another people."42 This perhaps best captures the
asymmetrical, non-responsible relation of present decisions to the future bearers of
consequences, as each new generation must "decolonize" their present from the past,
while responsibly administering their own colonization of their future. Commonwealths
are faced with the challenge of deciding whether their responsibility to posterity is best
served by positive intervention or benign neglect, just as contemporaneous nations must
balance the potential goods and harms of intervening in each other's affairs.
Hobbes can be heard addressing this challenge, advising restraint in esteeming
one's ability to, first, predict the distant outcomes of decisions, and, second, set by some
great decision the course of future generations. On the first point: "There is no action of
man in this life, that is not the beginning of so long a chayn of Consequence, as no
humans Providence, is high enough, to give a man a prospect to the end."43 This is quite
in line with Hobbes' skepticism about human reasoning, and despite the divine source of
a sovereign's duty, there is no supernatural power of prediction granted to those bound to




advised to focus on the time at hand, when actions are more predicable in their outcomes,
while still giving due attention to the future.
On the second point, I cite a passage of clearly inspirational to Schmitt's
conception of politics:
Nor is it enough for the security, which men desire should
last all the time of their life, that they be governed, and
directed by one judgement, for a limited time; as is one
Baiteli, or one Warre. For though they obtain a Victory by
their unanimous endeavour against a forraign enemy; yet
afterwards, when either they have no common enemy, or he
that by one part is held for enemy, is by another part held
for friend, they must needs by the difference of their
interests dissolve, and fall again into a Warre amongst
themselves.44
This would counsel against losing sight of future contingencies by identifying the
whole commonwealth as engaged in one moment of its history, or defined by one episode
of enmity to a particular enemy. The preservation of enduring interests in common is
necessary to the commonwealth's survival, and distortions caused by (historically
speaking) transitory passions hinder such longer-term stability. A mythic narration of the
commonwealth's future is needed to plot a course beyond the contemporary
circumstance, and while such fictive devices carry a risk of abuse (demagoguery,
44 Ibid, 119
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seductive optimism), participation in the imagination of the commonwealth's future is a
duty that Hobbes' sovereign cannot ignore. The use of myth can be employed either to
justify strong paternalism over the future, painting an optimistic picture of the
consequences of development and progress, or just as well it may be used to urge
restraint with cautionary images of a future ravaged by misguided ambition in the
present. The mythic mode ofpresenting the future as concretely determined, and of
identifying the people ofthat future with past constituents of a collective will, does not by
itself argue for restraint or ambition; it does, however, engender a pointed sense of care
and responsibility. By choosing to use mythic realizations and identifications, a deciding
authority strengthens whatever case it has made on other grounds for some direction and
degree of action, avoiding paralysis and weakness of legitimacy but not the pitfalls of
poor decision. Hobbes' insistence on the control of public confession and factual disputes
by the sovereign, combined with his recognition of the importance of religion and
superstition in the civil and political life of the commonwealth, suggest in my view a
possible endorsement of mythic presentation and justification of the state. It would be an
overstatement, however, to claim that my own view ofmyth is shared by Hobbes in
explicit or latent form.
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Chapter 2
The tradition ofWestern political thought which was in large part shaped by
Hobbes' contribution found itself challenged and transformed in the centuries following
Leviathan. The emergence ofnation-states, and increasing popular participation in
government through elected representatives, made obsolete Hobbes' singular focus on the
monarchical right to govern absolutely and raised questions of the partition of
sovereignty that the political vision of Leviathan could not accommodate without
revising its fundamental precepts.
The modern national states and (somewhat) popular government that took hold in
the 19th century were themselves threatened by shifts in the political landscape in the late
19th and early 20th century. Whereas the nationalisms of the 19th century placed
legitimacy on the basis of national representation, the increasing power ofpopular masses
pushed this basis further along a trajectory away from singular personal sovereignty,
through national representation and towards popular participation. However, the
questions of power, authority and collective welfare which framed Hobbes' politics
continued to frame these shifting discussions of an emerging mass age, and Hobbes'
treatment can be heard echoing in the foremost theorists of this new modernity.
Carl Schmitt has been called the "German Machiavelli" or the "German Hobbes".
This is not entirely inaccurate, but it should be qualified; I will return to the matter of
Schmitt's divergence from Hobbes shortly. Schmitt can, arguably, be identified as the
foremost thinker of his time who interrogated the nature of legitimacy, power and
authority in an era ofmass-society, democracy and parliamentary or republican
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governments. When his earliest, and still most important, works were produced during
the Weimar Republic, the nation state was already facing challenges from transnational
forces. Chiefly, ideological responses to the economic order of international industrial
capitalism emerged from (or, perhaps more accurately, seized upon and redefined) both
the left and right poles of popular politics, and demanded a response from established
state authority. The power of technological change, the dramatic shifts in wealth
production and distribution, and the concentration of population in cities, all contributed
to a modern crisis in which two broad camps emerged.
To the left lay those who sought to up-end the hierarchy ofprivate wealth and
state authority, either (1) by transferring wealth and power downwards to the
economically and politically disenfranchised (the statist socialist approach), or (2) by
destroying the economic and political systems and replacing them with less centralized
and less vertically differentiated structures of organization (the anarchist approach).
Mixtures of these two arch-left positions (such as anarcho-syndicalism) were prominent
as well. Many of the thinkers advocating from this side were following or responding to
Marxist and later Leninist socialism, though there existed a wide variety of socialist
visions besides this Hegelian thread. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, a contemporary of Marx,
was chief among these non-Marxist socialist thinkers, and an early anarchist who was
influential on a generation of socialist and anarchist thinkers straddling the turn from the
1 9th to the 20th century. Drawing both on Marxist history and philosophy, and on
Proudhon's more anarcho-syndicalist approach, Georges Sorel emerged as an
impassioned and rhetorically extreme advocate of interruptive and disruptive
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revolutionary changes, and took seriously the power of irrational forces in the shaping of
politics and history. He explicitly cites myth as a necessary tool to inspire and guide
popular action, and not merely in the sense of cynical manipulation.
To the right, more centralization and integration of state authority and economic
power was sought as a defence against these forces perceived as dangerous and
disordering. Most of Schmitt's predecessors in this tradition were Catholic royalist
thinkers, such as deMaistre, deBonald and Cortés, who advocated a restoration of
monarchical power following the bloody chaos that was ignited by France's revolutions.
Schmitt is very much the inheritor of this stridently arch-conservative lineage, but his
insight and force of historical relevance is due in no small part to his very serious regard
for the most trenchant critics to his left. Schmitt took Marx's thought and influence very
seriously45, and though he was certainly no Marxist, he shared Marx's antipathy for
bourgeois economics and (depoliticized) politics. He recognized that Marxist politics,
with its substantive goals, historical convictions and, very importantly, with its divisive
categories of class, posed a challenge that liberal politics was incapable of facing.
Schmitt also gives a great deal of attention to the work of Sorel, whose regard for the
politics of the irrational he shared. While Sorel and Schmitt could be read as polar
opposites in their values, approach and goals, they share a bond in their awareness of the
inadequacy ofprocedural, rational politics to manage the forces immanent in all politics
45 See, for instance, the third chapter of Schmitt's Crisis ofPariiamentaiy Democracy, "Dictatorship in
Marxist Thought", in which he writes admiringly of Marx's conviction, theoretical invention, and acute
awareness of historical contingency. Also, in The Concept ofthe Political, he writes "The most
conspicuous and historically the most effective example [of binary antitheses which replace more
complex constructions in times ofconflict] is the antithesis formulated by Karl Marx; bourgeoisie and
proletariat." 74
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and explosively charged by new qualities of modernity. Importantly for this thesis, he
also shared with Sorel a view that myth is an indispensable tool in shaping, guiding, and
legitimizing plans of action and forms of power.
Schmitt's contribution to this movement (the re-centering and elevation of state
authority) endures in part because it goes deeper than a mere praise or apologia for the
statist forces which culminated in the Fascisms of the 20s and 30s (and beyond). Rather,
like Machiavelli and Hobbes, his work prior to (and in some instances after) his Nazi
involvement addresses fundamental matters of power, legitimacy and authority that are
historically and metaphysically prior to any realized political system, Fascist or
otherwise. It is Schmitt's thoughts on a necessity to confront the political, the role of myth
in providing identity and substance to a people, and the grounding of sovereign
legitimacy that are ofprimary importance to this thesis, and I discuss his treatment of
these by first outlining his critique of an impotent liberalism from which, he believed,
politics needed to be saved.46
Returning to Schmitt's divergence from Hobbes, it should be noted that while
Schmitt's role in the theorizing of modern to post-modern Western governments is
46 Here is a typical Schmittian expression of antipathy towards liberalism from Politicai Theology, using
the words of Donoso Cortés: "The essence of liberalism is negotiation, the cautious half-measure, in
the hope that the definitive dispute, the decisive bloody battle, can be transformed into a parliamentary
debate and permit the decision to be suspended forever in an everlasting discussion." 63
And in his own words: "The kind of economic-technical thinking that prevails today is no longer
capable ofperceiving a political idea. ... Political ideas are generally recognized only when groups can
be identified that have a plausible economic interest in turning them to their advantage. Whereas, on
the one hand, the political vanishes into the economic or technical-organizational, on the other hand the
political dissolves into the everlasting discussion of cultural and philosophical-historical
commonplaces... The core of the political idea, the exacting moral decision, is evaded in both." Ibid.,
65
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analogous to Hobbes' role in the theorizing of sovereign kingdoms, there are important
substantive differences in the two thinkers' projects. Schmitt is not merely Hobbes
updated for the 20th century; his contribution is not foundational of a tradition in the way
that Hobbes' is (perhaps this may change). Some have even claimed that Schmitt and
Hobbes are in fact strongly opposed; Yves Charles Zarka wrote that Hobbes was himself
an arch anti-Schmittian.47 One key difference is that Hobbes offers a substantive basis for
the evaluation of a sovereign's actions; he claims that the protection of the peoples'
physical safety and enjoyment of life is the criterion by which a monarch qualifies him or
herself as sovereign. By linking sovereignty to the protection of subjects, Hobbes
grounded the right of monarchs in a reciprocal relationship of duty and, as such, argued
for a just basis of authority.48 He even goes so far as to claim a divine origin for the duty
laid on the sovereign, though as I have noted before this may have been somewhat
disingenuous. Schmitt, by contrast, offers little in the way of a basis ofjust authority or
moral imperatives for sovereign action49; rather, his groundings of state authority and
sovereign power are a descriptive account of the metaphysics of sovereignty and political
power. While Hobbes used theology (and scriptural revision) to bolster his arguments,
47 "En somme, Il n'y a plus anti-schmittien que Hobbes. Ce qui veut dire que Schmitt est livré d'une
manière constante et répétée à un détournement des positions philosophiques fondamentales de Hobbes.
Of ce détournement a consisté à arracher les concepts politiques de Hobbes au contexte de la rationalité
dans lequel ils ont été élaborés pour les reconfigurer dans le cadre d'une nouvelle mythologie
politique." Zarka, "La mythe contre la raison: Carl Schmitt ou la triple trahison de Hobbes", in Cari
Schmitt ou le mythe du politique, 47.
48 William E. Scheuerman notes that Schmitt's reading of Hobbes, and particularly his attribution of
decisionism to Hobbes, "obscures Hobbes' dependence on normative ideas (most notably, the idea of the
social contract)". "International Law as Political Myth", 540-541.
49 "Schmitt never put together a positive account of what political order should be. Indeed, he regarded
such an endeavour as part of the Enlightenment legacy which attempted to impose an unattainable
universal order on humankind. Rather he proceeded negatively through polemics against liberalism's
attempt to construct a rational political order." Dyzenhaus, "Liberalism After the Fall", 10.
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marshalling the content of religious doctrine to support his project, Schmitt uses theology
as a conceptual framework onto which he maps the ontology and metaphysics ofpolitics.
In summation, Schmitt can be characterized as much more formal and abstract than
Hobbes, even though he himself decried a substance-less formalism and metaphysical
nihilism in the liberal politics he attacked, and insisted on concreteness of all politics.50
He argued for a political virtue of doing well, i.e. clear apprehension and effective
agency. There are two important exceptions to this lack of content in his political
prescriptions: first, the political Catholicism which he endorses early on (in his 1923
work Roman Catholicism and Political Form) and which later disappears, at least in
explicit expression, in his subsequent writings.51 After a golden age of writings from
1 9 1 9's Political Romanticism to 1 932's Concept ofthe Political, Schmitt's support of
political unity and strong statism became particularized in a growing support of the Nazi
party, and his writing acquired a normative content ofVolkism, arguing for racial
homogeneity as the basis of state survival (see 1933's State, Movement, Volk). It is my
hope, and doubtless the hope ofmany other readers of Schmitt, that his theoretical
framework does not inevitably lead to adoption of the kind ofnormative content which he
himself chose in the nadir of his career.
Another key difference between Schmitt and Hobbes is the degree to which the
two thinkers' notions of politics are framed by ongoing change, and the different tasks of
explanation and justification posed by dominantly past- or future-regarding narratives of
50 "First, all political concepts, images, and terms ... are focused on a specific conflict and are bound to a
concrete situation..." Concept ofthe Politicai, 30
5 1 See McCormick's "Political Theory and Political Theology", p. 830-840 for a useful summary of the
early development of Schmitt's though away from explicit political Catholicism.
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authority and identity. Hobbes' world, while certainly tumultuous and witness to the first
signs of modernity, was less dynamic than Schmitt's in that sovereign entities like kings
and churches were prime movers of events in their realms. The modern and early post-
modern (that is to say, post-WWl) world of Schmitt was marked by forces and events
that were not necessarily controlled by the will of identifiable sources; sovereign rulers
were not free to simply maintain relations with external sovereigns and manage their own
affairs domestically, but rather were imposed upon by often diffuse and anonymous
forces. The image of the sovereign as a God in Leviathan conveys the notion that he or
she administers to a realm under his or her control, and by laws and orders shapes this
realm by will. This sovereign's defining duty is to wield supreme power justly and
competently. By contrast, Schmitt's sovereign is not all-powerful in the sense of dictating
the affairs ofhis or her realm; the Schmittian sovereign's defining duty and power is that
of decision. Faced with a world offerees beyond deliberate control, and a pace of social
and technical change that outstrips any desire to be the sole author of the path of a
nation's progress, decision rather than creation is the act by which a post-modem
sovereign shapes events. In a world which is already always in motion, navigation may
supplant construction as a prime survival skill.52
Schmitt also contravenes Hobbes' insistence on internal unity and avoidance of
discord by focusing on friend/enemy distinctions and insisting that a concrete internal
52 This comment merits further argument; the change in focus, from building a future from principles to
navigating the currents of change towards a future shaped by non-political currents, may not be so
dramatic as to constitute a complete inversion. Even if it did we may still ask if the latter position is an
apt approach to pervasive unpredictability and uncontrollability, or merely a mistaken capitulation of
sovereignty to "history" or "progress".
enemy be identified in order for political identity to emerge. Schmitt's heightened anxiety
about defining a people and escaping a dangerous ambiguity of identity is in contrast to
Hobbes' more practically tolerant (though still absolutist in principle) stance. Following
the preceding point about the more politically and socially dynamic context of Schmitt's
thought, however, it may be fairly accorded that a twentieth-century sovereign does not
have the power to prevent factions and disputes from arising, as might have been possible
in Hobbes' time; such preventative measures being obviated, reasserting unity and peace
by backing "friends" against "enemies" in a dispute may be the only means ofhastening
their resolution, if the dispute is in fact built on irreconcilable substantive differences.
Still, this does not excuse Schmitt from charges that he is overly insistent on resolution,
and fails to give due consideration to the option of simply enduring disputes rather than
seeking their absolute end.
Schmitt's emphasis on the need for decision and clarity above all else lies near the
heart of his, and others', attacks on liberalism, particularly in liberal parliamentary
democracies of a "bourgeois" stripe. Schmitt seems to respect those thinkers who are
most fundamentally opposed to his views on his most dear concerns (such as Sorel),
precisely because, first, they are aware of the existence and import of these concerns,
and, second, they align themselves unequivocally with one side of a dichotomy. Schmitt
finds this awareness and conviction lacking in the legalistic, procedural, formal
understanding ofpolitics he attributes to liberalism, or at least to a degenerate,
53 "As a guideline for politics, decisionism is obviously of limited value. There are, of course, situations
which require decision-making; but other situations can be overcome only by enduring, not dissolving,
tensions." Bernhard Schlink, "Why Carl Schmitt?", 433
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contradictory form of liberalism. The "anti-metaphysical metaphysics" of this political
stance, which enforces a nihilistic view of substantive values in politics without realizing
that this nihilism is itself an arrogation of values, represents for Schmitt a hypocrisy in
practice and a blindness in perception55. Failing to see that evaluative, substantive
disputes cannot be avoided in politics, and seeking to exclude such matters from the
practice of politics, liberalism is doomed, believes Schmitt, to fall under the wheels of
history. The deliberative, discursive model of decision-making is for Schmitt merely a
dodge, a procedure for separating off the parts of an issue which are not "political" in
Schmitt's sense and debating them ad nauseam while the core of the matter, which does
not admit ofmultilaterally satisfying compromise, is ignored. Citing an earlier critique by
one of his main influences, he wrote "Liberalism, with its contradictions and
compromises, existed for Donoso Cortés only in that short interim period in which it was
possible to answer the question 'Christ or Barabbas?' with a proposal to adjourn or
appoint a commission of investigation."56
This is of course an exaggeration of liberalism's, and for that matter any
parliamentarism's, bias against clear decision. In practice, decisions are sought and made,
and discussions are not interminable though they may drag on for decades. But another of
Schmitt's charges against liberalism, that in trying to abstain from decisions of value and
54 "On the one hand, [Schmitt] claims that [private interest groups'] politics are the real politics of
liberalism. On the other hand, he asserts that liberalism has no politics at all. ... It is a contradiction that
pervades the doctrine to reside at its deepest level because liberalism's rationalist metaphysics is
antimetaphysical." Dyzenhaus, "Now the Machine Runs Itself, 5
55 The uncharitable interpretation of liberalism's neutrality is that is nihilistic with regard to normative
content. A charitable stance would be to suppose that liberalism's reliance on discussion and argument
to produce consensus in fact reveals a faith, not always explicit, in discoverable normative principles.
56 Political Theology, 62
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partisanship it ignores the essence of the political, hits deeper than his caricatures of
parliamentary dithering. In one of his signature phrases,57 Schmitt identifies as
definitively political those contests in which participants may be distinguished as friends
and enemies. More than simply a sociological comment about the usefulness of outside
foes in political practice, this point removes "politics" from a settled, predictably
mechanistic relationship with economics, technocratic management, public relations and
so on, and gives it an interruptive, violent (in the abstract sense) and extra-systematic
character. A politics (in the common sense) which places a premium on inclusion and
neutrality cannot begin to engage political questions in Schmitt's sense, because its first
instinct is to dispel or avoid the enmity which originates politics. The enemy discovered
in these political moments is, says Schmitt, not abstract but an actual person capable of
killing or being killed; this personification of the sources and sites of enmity makes
abstraction to less bloody conceptions impossible without diverging from Schmitt.
57 ""The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between
friend and enemy. This provides a definition in the sense of a criterion and not as an exhaustive
definition or one indicative of substantial content." The Concept ofthe Political, 26
On Schmitt's currency as a source of emblematic phrases, Bernhard Schlink writes "Today Schmitt's
slogans no longer serve as shorthand for his theories. They fascinate in and of themselves. They are
superbly formulated - and yet, the much praised sheen of Schmitt's language does not result from
particularly clear or beautiful speech, but from resolute and clear-cut, determined wording. It comes
stomping in, allows for no rebuttal, requires no justification." "Why Carl Schmitt?", 433.
Stathis Gourgouris, in "Schmitt with Sorel", quotes Heiner Müller making a similar point: "Carl Schmitt
is theater. His texts are theatrical performances. I am not interested in whether he was right or not."
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1 cite these comments not to discount Schmitt's importance, or to suggest that his reception is based on
mistaken or superficial interpretations of his work, but rather to acknowledge the significant problem of
his evocative language, which, as with other theorists who employ striking style, poses a non-
philosophical distraction to readers of his work. The irrational violence with which Schmitt and his
theoretical cohort are associated makes this charismatic style doubly problematic in that it gives rise to a
secondary literature that is emotionally as well as intellectually inspired.
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Schmitt emphasizes war, the actual killing ofpeople organized as friends against
enemies, as the endpoint ofpolitical dispute. In adapting Schmitt for more peaceful
purposes, I am hopeful that the power of his theoretical frames can survive a twisting of
this last point away from the inevitability ofbloodletting. Fritsch58 notes that much of the
recent Schmitt scholarship (in particular Mouffe) is devoted to this task of evading the
bellicose and eliminationist antagonism against concrete human enemies as a
consequence of Schmitt's project, while preserving Schmitt's explanation of politics and
political psychology. In a section ofPolitics ofFriendship referenced in Fritsch's article,
Derrida claims that "Schmitt's entire discourse posits and supposes ... a concrete sense of
the concrete which he opposes ... to the spectral (gespentisch)."59 Derrida proceeds to
suggest that the concrete in Schmitt is, rather, itself spectral in its inconceivability to
conceptual and abstract thinking.
As I have noted before, I do not wish to engage with Derrida here because of the
separately grand task of integrating his own system into my work in this thesis. But this
remark bears some attention; the "concrete sense ofthe concrete " which is at work in
politics is to be contrasted with the "spectral sense of the concrete" at work in theory. The
purely concrete resists theorization because it is not some instantiation of forms which
operate in an abstracted understanding; to manipulate the concrete in theory (and in the
themes of myth) it must be less than purely concrete, partly constructed. Perhaps an
insistence on total concreteness precludes a faithful application of Schmitt's theory to
concrete others, in that their total concreteness has to be mixed with a certain fictive
58 Fritsch, "Antagonism and Democratic Citizenship", 176.
59 Derrida, Politics ofFriendship, 116-117.
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identity as well to be identified with a role in abstract theoretical notions about concrete
relations. Again, this particular thread cannot be adequately addressed here without a full
treatment of Derrida's particularities, but the point he makes here is intriguing on its face.
At the time of Schmitt's early writings, only one force in the world was powerful
enough to create the kind of catastrophic, lethal danger capable of giving to political
debate an existentially urgent character. This force was warfare, the deliberate killing of
people by other people on a huge and, in ancient times and again in the First World War,
totalizing scale. By forcing a decision on whom one will fight with and against for
survival, war gives a political identity; but I believe there are other forces which grant
this existential character and make possible the creating ofpolitical identity. New
technologies, and the cumulative effects of older ones, raise the spectre of human
destruction in ways that previously could only be imagined in fires, bombs and bullets
exchanged by hostile opponents. Nuclear weapons (and to a lesser extent nuclear power
generation) bring the possibility of vast, even complete, human destruction by rogue
decision or accident. Similarly, environmental degradation and climate change caused by
industrial activity also threaten to bring disease, death, and a radical curtailment of
possible forms of human life.
To these already familiar threats can be added more speculative dangers emerging
from technological and industrial development, such as nano-materials, autonomous
robotics, and high-energy physics research. While these dangers have not yet produced
friend/enemy distinctions of an intensity comparable to those that emerged from total
wars, they may yet do so if the threats they pose can be sensed as imminent and urgent
44
rather than merely morally or prudentially important. Importantly, the accidental quality
of these threats changes the role of intentionality and agency in shaping the enmity
between factions. Where the engine of destruction is a continual human action, as in wars
prior to full automation, personal and absolute enmity must be sustained to bring about
the crisis. Where the crisis can be assured long before its actual manifestation (that is to
say, the sufficient causal prerequisites for producing a crisis met, where such causes
produce their effect necessarily but at long delay), and effected by means other than
deliberate human action, the role of enmity in creating the crisis that gives political
identities is no longer essential. Disputes of a political character still involve the
opposition of two or more sides faced with the prospect of death, but no longer solely
because one side seeks to kill the other; rather, the threat of death can come from an
enemy's victory in deciding on a course of action which unintentionally kills. The
friend/enemy struggle in such a scenario remains existentially important and all-
consuming in its urgency, but does not require enmity-inspired violence as the cause or
mechanism of destruction. An example of such a scenario would be the upstream
diversion or contamination of a downstream people's sole water source, or upwind
operation of potentially catastrophic chemical facilities.
Such an impersonal, temporally mediate and accidental source of danger does not
have the same political force upon the public imagination as the enemy on the doorstep,
however. To arouse political identifications and existential seriousness, they must be
perceived as imminent and actual. To effect such a shift in perception, and make such
possible dangers a basis for the political in Schmitt's sense, a modal change in political
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discourse is required. Simply acknowledging the factually supported possibility of
disaster is often insufficient to excite the existential awareness of danger, and thus
produce a political response. This is both an empirical point about thresholds of public
reaction, but also a theoretical point about the engagement of the existential
consciousness by myth. There must be a step beyond what can be said within the bounds
of evidentiary substantiation, and beyond the immediate edicts of reason, into the realm
ofmyth. As it happens, Schmitt already presaged the mythical politicization of
technological issues.
In Schmitt's time two great myths battled for supremacy; a once-diminished but
quickly rebounding nationalism, and a steadily growing socialism. Against transnational
socialist myths, the invocation of strong genetic, telluric and historical ties was perhaps
the only strong candidate to compete for public identification.60
Socialism/anarchism and nationalism certainly loom large in Schmitt's discussion
of competing ideologies, and defined the application ofhis theories in his own time. But
in addition to these two already-aging spirits occupying the world, Schmitt saw another
great mythological space which promised to shape the near future. The technological
world-view, growing out of modern confidence in human ingenuity and industry,
emboldened by the wildly successful flourishing of technology and the ways of living
which it enabled, was itself taking pride of place among ideologies. While the
technicality of parliamentary democracy or liberal legalism neutralized and deadened
60 In The Crisis ofParliamentary Democracy, Schmitt quotes Mussolini "Our myth is the nation, the great
nation which we want to make into a concrete reality for ourselves." Schmitt adds, "In the same speech
he called socialism an inferior mythology." 76
politics, technological alteration of life did just the opposite. In "The Age of
Neutralizations and Depoliticizations", Schmitt said:
The spirit of technicity, which has led to the mass belief in
an anti-religious activism, is still spirit; perhaps an evil and
demonic spirit, but not one which can be dismissed as
mechanistic and attributed to technology. It is perhaps
something gruesome, but not itself technical and
mechanical. It is the belief in an activistic metaphysics - the
belief in unlimited power and the domination ofman over
nature, even over human nature; the belief in the unlimited
"receding of natural boundaries," in the unlimited
possibilities for change and prosperity. Such a belief can be
called fantastic and satanic, but not simply dead, spiritless,
or mechanized soullessness.
Technology is no longer neutral ground in the sense
of the process ofneutralization; every strong politics will
make use of it. For this reason, the present century can only
be understood provisionally as the century of technology.
How ultimately it should be understood will be revealed
only when it is known which type of politics is strong
enough to master the technology and which type of genuine
friend-enemy groupings can develop on this new ground.6
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The technological society represents a new step beyond the mass society in its
bypassing of state control. The mass age, with millions of somewhat economically and
politically enfranchised individuals generating a social dynamism beyond the direct
control of sovereign political power, made the unitary, singly personified ruler of Hobbes
less relevant. As Denis Tierweiler notes, "C'est précisément parce qu'il veut prendre en
compte la démocratisation, et un certain pluralisme qu'il sait inévitable, que Schmitt
déplace l'accent de l'État vers le politique."62 Schmitt's political analysis can survive a
diminishment of the state because, as he notes in the opening of The Concept ofthe
Political, the political is prior to the state.63 In the passage above he argues that his
concept will survive whatever transformations attend the technological age as well. I will
argue in the final chapter of this work that, indeed, his concept does retain its relevance,
because whatever the physical substrate supporting a given era's political life may be, the
affairs conducted upon that physical basis retain elements of the same mythological and
theological character of past epochs.
Like Hobbes before him, Schmitt believed that sovereign authority required a
(new) basis for legitimacy.64 He believed that the politics of the Enlightenment, a
discursive liberalism, could not provide such a basis, in part because of its habit ofusing
6 1 The Concept ofthe Politicai, 94-95
62 Tierweiler, "Georges Sorel et Carl Schmitt: D'une théorie politique du mythe à l'autre", in Cari Schmitt
ou le mythe du politique, 30
63 "The concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political." The Concept ofthe Political, 19
64 "As do Hobbes and Kelsen, Schmitt believes that traditional modes ofjustifying political authority are
no longer available." Dyzenhaus, "Now the Machine Runs Itself, 5.
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legality as its paradigm of legitimacy. As an empty form without substantive
commitments of value, legality appeals to the "nihilism" that Schmitt attributes to
liberalism; by applying law equally, methodically and mechanistically, the biased
imposition of values can be avoided, and neutrality preserved.65 But legality cannot
ground its own legitimacy, much as deontological formulations of ethics cannot ground
moral obligations. Schmitt argues that it is legitimacy that grounds legality, and not the
other way around; and as legitimacy comes "before the law", it must have a substantive
basis rather than a grounding in conformity to legal form.66
The substantive ground of legitimacy for Schmitt, Sorel, and earlier partisans of
proletarian and monarchical supremacy, necessarily lies outside of not merely legal
logic but (partly) outside of any rational basis. The legitimacy by which the sovereign
person or body claims a right to power is invented apart from the logic by which such
power is applied systematically and consistently. The original monarchists invoked the
divine will which favoured kings, and Hobbes articulated a somewhat subtler argument
which replaced divine lineage, or manifest favour, with divinely originated duty to
protect. The holder of this duty was designated by the criterion of effective protection by
65 See second quotation from Political Theology in fh. 46
66 "Legality, for Schmitt, is a formal condition that must be given meaning and content by a prior
structure of legitimacy: legitimacy is obtained only through the representation of the unified will of the
historical existence of the people, and this must be presupposed as the origin of the constitution, and
indeed of all law. On Schmitt's account, politics is before the law, and the necessary content of law
cannot be stipulated in abstraction from the particular political system in which it originates. Law, in
short, cannot constitute legitimacy on its own, and law that is not informed by a particular political will
is always likely to undermine the legitimacy of a political order." Seitzer, Jeffrey and Thornhill,
Christopher, "An Introduction to Carl Schmitt's Constitutional Theory: Issues and Context" in Schmitt's
Constitutional Theory, 9.
67 "In one ofhis first published works (Gesetz und Urteil - 1912), Schmitt vigourously contests the idea
that a legal order may be treated as a closed system of norms. He forcefully denies, for example, that in
a particular case, one could reach a correct decision by a process of deduction or generalization on the
basis of existing legal rules." Wolin, "Carl Schmitt, Political Existentialism, and the Total State", 395
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force, having the effect of not simply legitimating existing power but imposing normative
standards upon its exercise. After royalty was deposed, divine favour was manifestly
lacking, but the terror and suffering ofpost-revolutionary struggles gave Restoration
thinkers a purely secular ground for monarchical legitimacy; clarity, security and order
(history serves Hobbes well). Schmitt writes, in Political Theology, that they "heightened
the moment of the decision to such an extent that the notion of legitimacy, their starting
point, was finally dissolved. ... [Cortés] demanded a political dictatorship. In the cited
remarks of deMaistre we can also see a reduction of the state to the moment of decision
... to an absolute decision created out of nothingness."68 "But", Schmitt adds, "this
decisionism is essentially dictatorship, not legitimacy."69
The legitimacy that was missing from a pure decisionism had to be framed in
democratic terms, Schmitt recognized. He claimed that all contemporary forms of
government, save for Italian fascism, made some claim to legitimacy by way of the
democratic character of their right to power.70 The flexibility of the concept of
"democracy" allowed nearly any minority assembly within a state to claim the title of true
representative of the people. Thus establishing the criterion of "democratic
representation" for legitimacy did not designate or exclude any disputant in a struggle for
power, and did not even indisputably favour majority over minority rule; the argument
could still be made that the majority were not yet emancipated from a subjugated
68 Political Theolog)', 65-66
69 Ibid.
70 "Only Italian Fascism seems to place no value on being 'democratic' With that exception one must say
that until now the democratic principle has been universally accepted without contradiction." The Crisis
ofParliamentaiy Democracy, 30
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mentality and as such could not function as a true democracy. The identity of the people
not being a neutral given fact, there is no clear designation of the proper person or
persons who represent or share in that identity and as such have legitimate claims to
power. As Schmitt writes, "All of these identities [on which democratic arguments rest]
are not palpable reality, but rest on a recognition of the identity. It is not a matter of
something actually equal legally, politically or sociologically, but rather of
identifications."7'
Thus the holders of power can legitimize their position "democratically" after the
fact, by educating the public to recognize the salient identity by which the rulers' power is
also the peoples' power. Reflecting on the familiar (at the time) practice of post-
revolutionary "peoples' education", Schmitt writes:
The people can be brought to recognize and express their
own will correctly through the right education. This means
nothing else but that the educator identifies his will at least
provisionally with that of the people... The consequence of
this educational theory is a dictatorship that suspends
democracy in the name of a true democracy that is still to be
created. Theoretically, this does not destroy democracy, but it
is important to pay attention to it because it shows that




Such endorsement of stark public manipulation shocks the conscience ofnot only
liberals but any ethical person who feels the Kantian call to respect the autonomy of other
persons. Richard Wolin charges that "Schmitt studiously avoids taking democracy
seriously in the etymological sense", that "Schmitt's commitment to democracy is a
pseudo-commitment", and that "[wjith the highly tendentious separation of democracy
from its supporting liberal institutions ... he has succeeded in rendering all modern
historical incarnations of the term meaningless - precisely his object."73 Schmitt certainly
stares into the void of democratic cynicism, positioning himself in a chain of thinkers
with little regard for democracy as the liberal tradition understands it. But to dismiss his
anti-liberal view of democracy by claiming democracy is meaningless without liberalism
is to perform precisely the kind of identification-cum-legitimization move that is being
described.
On Schmitt's critique, liberalism is poorly suited to address questions of
democratic legitimacy because it cannot draw the friend-enemy distinction, and so cannot
identify the people to be represented, let alone the people who ought to represent them
(except for a legal criterion stipulating correct electoral procedure and bureaucratic
divisions of responsibility). As Schmitt notes extensively in the work of Sorel and other
radicals, the identity of the people has always and (per these thinkers) must always be a
mythologized identity, and the popular will is invented rather than discerned by polls or
plebiscites (though these are technical tools of no small utility in bolstering the claims to
democratic legitimacy of a sitting power, provided they produce the correct results).
73 Wolin, "Carl Schmitt, Political Existentialism, and the Total State", 402
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For Schmitt's contemporaries and immediate fore-runners on the left, the meaning
of political institutions and movements is not given by a legal structure or by a rational
model of governance, but rather by an irrational, psycho-spiritually engaging myth, often
of a final and absolute victory over history. In the words of Sorel, "Les mythes
révolutionnaires actuels sont presque purs; ils permettent de comprendre l'activité, les
sentiments et les idées des masses populaires se préparant à entrer dans une lutte décisive;
ce ne sont pas des descriptions de choses, mais des expressions de volontés."'4 As much
as Schmitt draws on Sorel for his notion of politics exceeding the rational, there are
important differences to be noted. Denis Tierweiler points to subtle differences between
political theology and political mythology, arguing that, while both suppose that a purely
rational foundation of political order is insufficient, the former is cognitive and
interpretative, the latter emotional and psychological.75 I would add to that an
esoteric/exoteric distinction, as political theology tends to be circulated among the
"political clergy" of the state (no doubt, Political Theology was feverishly circulated
among Washington's political clergy for the past couple of decades), whereas political
mythology tends to be more suited to a mass audience, as least as political mythology is
portrayed by Sorel.76 For Schmitt, both political theology and political mythology are
-important to his project; Tierweiler argues that Schmitt constantly balances between the
74 Sorel, Réflexions sur la violence, 25
75 Tierweiler, "Georges Sorel et Carl Schmitt", 22
76 "[L]es hommes qui participent aux grands mouvements sociaux, se représentent leur action prochaine
sous forme d'images de batailles assurant le triomphe de leur cause. Je proposais de nommer mythes ces
constructions dont la connaissance offre tant d'importance pour l'historien. ...je voulais montrer qu'il ne
faut pas chercher à analyser de tels systèmes d'images, comme on décompose une chose en ses
éléments, qu'il faut les prendre en bloc comme des forces historiques, et qu'il faut surtout se garder de
comparer les faits accomplis avec les représentations qui avaient été acceptées avant l'action." Sorel,
Réflexions sur la violence, 1 9-20
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two, siding with theology as a jurist, and siding with mythology as a theorist of state,
knowing that the foundation ofpolitical order must use images and symbols which only
mythology can furnish.77
77 "Georges Sorel et Carl Schmitt", 22-23
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Chapter 3
In the preceding two chapters I have illustrated certain facets of a tradition in
Western political thought, these being questions of the nature and identity of sovereignty,
the limits and conditions of legitimacy, and the role of extra-factual and extra-rational
modes of thought and discourse in conceptualizing political ideas. These extra-factual
and extra-rational modes are political theology and political mythology, and I will first
attempt to distinguish them from each other before articulating my own understanding of
the latter.
Political theology, in the sense articulated by Schmitt as the conception of
political sovereignty and authority in secularized theological terms, is quite clearly
Hobbes' trade in Leviathan, although Hobbes does not use a purely secular approach; in
the pseudo-theology of the state, the sovereign is above the law, but in the literally
theological scheme of political morality the sovereign is accountable to God. Schmitt's
explicit critique of the theological patterns of thought and argument represent a turn in
the tradition, by which these conceptual schemata laid upon political questions become
themselves the objects of theorization and analysis. This turn does not mark the end of
the practice of political theology in political theory, of course, but rather the beginning of
self-consciously theological argument about political essentials. Thus theological political
conceptions cease to be implicitly normative grounds, as in Hobbes, and become
explicitly descriptive of the ontology ofpolitical thought, at least within a certain
tradition ofpolitical concerns. Schmitt represents this new reflective theological
approach, setting a theologically inspired political framework as the logical rather than
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moral constraint of political theory. I do not mean by this that a theological substance
grounds Schmittian politics, such as in his early argument in Roman Catholicism and
Political Form according to which Catholicism permits the politically originary
identification of friend and enemy to be made.78 Rather, I mean that, as in Hobbes'
parallels between divine and civil obedience, theological models of sovereignty illustrate
the innate limits of how sovereignty must function.
Schmitt also touches on political mythology, as distinct from theology,
particularly as it emerged as a political force in the early 20th century in mass movements
such as socialism. Whereas political theology's treatment of the sovereign mirrors the
monotheistic theological treatment of a unitary and absolute God, political mythology
(per Schmitt) is essentially pagan79. This shift parallels the change from a Hobbesian
tradition defined by theories of singular authority which presuppose a monarchical
sovereign, towards a modern tradition in which sovereignty is diffusely located in the
people, united and exercised through law . To the extent that the people is itself conceived
as a unitary entity which may be identified with a singular will, it remains within the field
ofpolitical theology. But the linkage between this unitary identity and the disparate
empirical people ("multitude" as opposed to "person") is, I claim, political mythology,
neither purely historical nor purely abstract. Political mythology can also be contrasted
with political theology in its inherent dynamism as opposed to theology's stasis. This
stasis on the part of theology comes from the eternity and unity of the singular God which
78 McCormick, "Political Theory and Political Theology'', 831-832
79 "The theory of myth is the most powerful symptom of the decline of the relative rationalism of
parliamentary thought. [...] The last remnants of solidarity and a feeling of belonging together will be
destroyed in the pluralism of an unforeseeable number of myths. For political theology that is
polytheism, just as every myth is polytheistic." The Crisis ofParliamentary Democracy, 76
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defines the theological view (in monotheistic traditions of course), whereas the dynamism
and multiplicity ofmythology reflects a mythic engagement with more worldly questions
of origin, development and change, inviting a multiplicity of responses. The power of
theology is its engagement with abstract and eternal constancy, while the power ofmyth
is its adaptability (as Bottici writes, "political myth [...] must remain open to the
possibility of being renegotiated according to new experiences and needs. To put it
bluntly, a political myth expresses itself through variants..."80).
Under this conception of theology vs. mythology, the subject matter of the former
is the absolute, the eternal and unconditional, whereas the subject matter of the latter is
the historical (as opposed to ahistorical but not to prehistorical) and thus subject to
worldly principles of generation and conditioning. Thus the nature of sovereign power
and the qualities of an absolute sovereign are of concern to political theology, whereas
the connection of these concepts to identifiable entities and histories within the world are
mythological questions. Mythology does not supplant theology but rather tries to connect
to theological objects, humanizing the divine and sacralizing the human in turns.
Hobbes' treatment ofmonarchical sovereign right attempted, among other things,
to show that the sovereign's absolute right was proper both to reason and justice, not
merely secured by power. The identity of the sovereign's mandate with God's is a
theological, ahistorical move (though the mandate itself is of course applied by the
sovereign in historical time). But Hobbes also engaged in political mythology by creating
a narrative which identified the public will with the sovereign's, and the myth (an
exceedingly successful and enduring one) is that of the social contract. The narrative of
80 Bottici, "Philosophies of Political Myth, a Comparative Look Backwards", 370-371
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the social contract is pseudo-historical, tracing a causal chain of worldly, human
conditions and reactions from a pre-social state towards a contemporary order which,
under this pseudo-historical view, is just and rational. The narrative is not wholly
historical, because it does not cite a discreet event in time where such a contract was
agreed, but rather explains how such a contractual relation emerges as a stage of social
historical logic. Nor is it wholly fictional, as it grounds relations and rights which are
concretely manifest in the social and legal life of the state. The comme si to comme ça
turn which makes myth a real political force is clearly illustrated; narratively, sovereign
right is explained as if there were some contractual founding event, but practically, the
right is exercised as fully real.
The fact that there is no actual contract in this case is not an impediment because
myth presents the speculative and the fictive as true. If, however, there had been an
original contract forged between concrete persons, and this was cited as the ground of
sovereign right, there might be another challenge against the legitimacy ofthat right. To
wit, it may be argued that despite the contracting of obedience for protection by particular
persons at a particular moment in history, this right expires along with the signatories.
But this challenge is met by another aspect ofpolitical mythology, which is its power to
make present, in the temporal and phenomenological senses, what is physically removed.
This power to invest the historically remote (or even never-existent) with a presence
treated as concrete is accomplished through identification, and these identifications are
the ground for legitimacy in succession. The myth of creation stories identifies a living
institution or people with a pre-historical event, or a pre-historical past with a materially
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evident history; the myth ofheroic national character identifies a whole people with
exemplary individuals (themselves fictional or not); the myth ofThe People identifies a
disparate population of individuals with a unitary public self.
If, therefore, an actual contract were the basis of sovereign right, the mythic
identifications of predecessors with successors can extend the contract's legitimacy
beyond the actual signatories, retroactively characterizing this historical compact as the
manifestation of essential relations; the People, instantiated by particular persons, are one
party to the agreement, and the Sovereign, instantiated by a particular legal or natural
person, is the other. Myth is not immediately necessary to explain such transfer of
contractual rights and obligations from original signatory parties to inheritors;
justifications for such transferability can be offered on legal or institutional historical
grounds. But such justifications, while perhaps satisfactory as a practical public
argument, ultimately lack legitimizing force if these legal and institutional bonds do not
themselves rest upon mythic identifications of the creators and bearers of legal and
institutional roles. Thus myth remains necessary in principle to ground the legitimacy of
such inherited rights and obligations, even if it is never publicly invoked as a ground of
justification.
In the case of a monarchical arrangement like that defended (with some provisos)
by Hobbes, the need to engage in mythic identifications like these is most obvious. To a
democratic mindset, it is clear that where there is claimed a right for a single person to
author decisions in the name of a people and hold power over them, when that person is
not elected by nor accountable to that people (barring a unilateral dissolution of the
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contract), such right must be grounded outside of a people's publicly evident,
sociologically manifest consent to be subject. Without mechanisms to show empirically
the grounds of sovereign right, such as elections or other consultative means, the identity
of ruler and ruled seems prima facie baseless.
Are these myths of identity no longer required in a democratic state, then, if
systems are in place to consult an electorate and respond to the expressed desires of the
represented? I would argue that they remain necessary in principle, despite an empirical
narrowing of the gap between the sovereign and the subjects. Mechanisms of
representation, consultation and accountability which typify (but arguably do not
guarantee) a democratic politics make it less obvious that there is a lack of identity
between the person of the sovereign and the person of the people represented. But the gap
remains, and can never be eliminated, unless each person is to be a sovereign unto him or
herself; even then, there is the problem of self-identity over time. Any politics wherein a
collective identity is used to describe the will, interests or authority of a community of
individuals united will create a gap between actual identities of the constituents of the
polity and the characterizations which the community presents to itself.
Where the actions and decisions of state (or, even more so, where there is no state
but simply a political community) are effected through deeply participatory and
structurally devolved mechanisms, this identity gap may be no more than a mundane fact
of language; just as we may assume that the physical universe is not Newtonian but still
describe it in such terms for the sake of convenience. The gap remains in principle and in
fact wherever there is a self-recognition by the actors as a people, and wherever a
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conception of sovereignty is at work, but it can shrink into inconspicuousness where
divisions of ruler and ruled are so narrow that legitimacy is never problematized. But
where societies are marked by thick layers of representation and hierarchical
concentration, and legitimacy is still regarded as resting upon a contact between the two
sides of representational and subsumptive relationships, the credibility of fictions of
identity remains crucial to claims ofpolitical right.
As noted in the last chapter, the era ofmass politics and decapitation (figuratively
and literally) of absolutist political structures introduced a new uncertainty into popular
and sovereign identifications. Multiple conceptions of democracy competed for
legitimacy on multiple conceptions of popular identity, and a key variable in these
conceptions is the degree to which "the people" was defined in narrow or broad temporal
bounds. A simple representational definition of democracy might argue that "the people"
are constituted by the sum of the present population, and that the will of "the people"
may be ascertained by plebiscite, meetings, and other forms of direct consultation. But
another view, powerfully advanced in revolutionary France and Russia and later under
postcolonial circumstances, held that "the people" should be defined with a strong
weighting towards the future. The true character of "the people" could only emerge after
some liberating measures were enacted to free the present populace from a deluded self-
characterization, described in terms of slave morality, colonial identity, etc. And so the
democratically legitimate bearers of sovereign authority were not those who represented
a present consensus, but rather a minority whose will was identical with the will that
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would be shared by "the people" after it had been adequately re-identified with itself.81
This temporal broadness ofpopular identity also reaches back in time, permitting a
reactionary minority to claim that the present instantiation of "the people" is itself a
deviate minority, linking democratic legitimacy to an identification with antecedent
generations.
There are of course many pernicious uses of the myth in this sense, and the
opportunities for such abuse grows in times of change, where it becomes apparent that
the collective character of a people is set to shift, and the definitive elements of its
identity are no longer clear. But these hazards are unavoidable so long as the state, or
something like it, continues to recognize itself within a historical past and future. The
further ahead into the future that a state's decisions may reach, the greater the need to
extend relations of identities. Without some fiction of an identity of the present with the
future, the legitimacy of a sovereign authority to decide for the inhabitants ofthat future
world is without a democratic grounding. A sovereign may disavow a political
representation of the future, claiming that the impact present decisions have upon the
future is inevitable and merely imposes a moral burden of care, but not of representation.
But such a minimization of relations to the future would, I think, only suffice when the
question of how to face the future is strictly ethical; when the issue takes on existential
tones, as in questions ofphysical and cultural survival, legitimacy calls for deeper
grounds than simply conscientious negotiation of responsibilities. To simply decide upon
the conditions under which future inhabitants will live, by acting in a manner which is
expected to have significant and enduring effects in that future, but without identifying
81 See, for instance. Schmitt's discussion of Jacobinism in The Crisis ofParliamentaiy Democracy, 26-28.
62
the present people and sovereign with those future peoples and sovereigns, is to relate to
the future in a colonial fashion, as noted in the preceding chapter. It is of course possible,
because the inhabitants of the future have no recourse against present decisions. But to
restrict the legitimacy of sovereign authority to an identification with the present
constitution of the people is to weaken that legitimacy.
First, such a presentist self-isolation of sovereignty from the future (or from the
past) severs relations of succession. By disregarding the will of temporally removed
instantiations of a people, a present sovereign dis-identi fi es itself with the future
sovereign; the reason for this being that the future sovereign in question will, assuming
that it claims for itself a democratic ground of legitimacy, be identified with and thus
legitimized by that future people. A temporally particular instantiation of sovereign
authority thereby removes itself from the succession of sovereignty, by restricting its
popular identification to its contemporary population, and places itself in competition
with other sovereign identifications. It should be noted that this is true of Hobbesian and
democratic standards of sovereignty, though Schmitt's decisionistic criterion of
sovereignty requires no such link in legitimate succession. If the sovereign is truly
following a contemporaneous popular mandate to disregard identifications with the
future, the whole popular sovereignty loses a claim to (democratic) legitimacy in
exercising any authority beyond its own immediate present.
Second, a claim to legitimacy which is laid on the narrow ground of identification
with only the present constitution of the people faces strong challenges from competing
claims to legitimacy which are grounded in broader identifications, such as those
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minority groups mentioned earlier who would take upon themselves the mantle of
ancestry or posterity. Practically speaking, a narrow identification with the present allows
state decisions solely benefiting the present people to be made without hypocrisy, and
reap the electoral rewards ofpolitical clientelism. But such "transactional" relations of
governance are not political in an existentially compelling sense, and may become
irrelevant in crises where the substantively moral or existential bases of legitimacy
supersede. For instance, a politics of ecological responsibility which turns on procedural
rules of risk assessment and due compensation for damages may suffice in a normal
period, where the resources and attached interests protected by such measures are thought
to be harmed by degrees but not threatened in their very existence. When such latter
threats are perceived, the politics of mitigation and compensation, with its assumptions of
fungible values, may fall under demands for an absolutist protection on grounds ofmoral
or existential necessity.
The identification of a given impersonation of sovereignty with a sovereignty
which persists over time, rather than a succession of generationally parochial self-same
identities, is central to the very concept of sovereignty. My own essential definition of
sovereignty, inspired by but not identical to Hobbes' and Schmitt's, is an unconditionality
of choice. This self-exemption from restricting conditions is, I believel the essence of
both Hobbes' and Schmitt's conception of the sovereign being beyond the law. In the case
of Hobbes' absolutism, this extra-legality could simply be the normal case for the
sovereign. In Schmitt's more democratic context, however, this exemption from law is
reserved for exceptional cases and while normal conditions obtain the sovereign is
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subject to constitutional limits. Beyond a simply legal exemption, a particular
sovereign's unification with a persisting sovereign identity removes him/her/them from
other temporally particular conditions of decision, such as popular sentiment or appeals
to technical and economic expediency. This is not to say that the sovereign is totally
insulated from these conditions, but rather that the sovereign's legitimacy already rests
partly outside of the reciprocal or curatorial relations with a present people, and this not
merely presentist basis of legitimacy can be emphasized to justify decisions to which a
present people may not consent. I am thinking here not ofnear future regarding decisions,
such as deficit-cutting that benefits the state's people a few decades hence, and thus can
be justified by appeal to the future interests of those same persons present at the time of
decision; this particular unconditionality granted by a cross-temporal sovereign identity
really becomes conspicuous in cases where the people whom decisions regard are
inaccessibly remote, either far in the future or even in the past.
I have so far discussed the use of myths of identity to establish representative
legitimacy. But there is another use of myth in politics that I wish to explore here, which
is the sharpening of future-regarding responsibilities in democracies. The mythical mode
of discourse, as 1 understand it, is the presentation of the speculative and unrealized as
concrete and present. This does not necessarily mean that what plainly does not exist is
82 Of course, Schmitt defines the sovereign by the power to identify precisely such exceptional cases, and
the Hobbesian sovereign is well-advised to conduct himself in a lawful manner when the exercise of an
overriding absolutism is unnecessary and antagonistic to civil peace; in practice the sovereigns of these
two thinkers may be less different than would be suggested in theory.
83 An example of a past-regarding decision would be the construction of a memorial promised to a group
who had served the people long ago. Assume the people to be so recognized are so remote that the
present advocacy of their dessert by living descendants is not a factor, and there exists no direct
beneficiaries of their contribution to push for their recognition. Even in such absence of a mandate from
the present, the sitting sovereign can still legitimize the decision to sacrifice present resources in honour
of these past persons by identifying itself with the historical sovereign which incurred the debt.
claimed to plainly exist, but rather that what is not yet present is discussed in terms of
certainty and immediacy. Such a mythic mode can be used to vividly represent the past,
in the sense ofmaking again present what has become temporally remote; and this past
can be faithful to history or deliberately revisionist (other possibilities exist beyond these
two, and unreflective revisionism is probably the most common approach).
It is the making-present and making-concrete of the future which concerns me in
the application ofpolitical myth, as these myths of the future are what shape the present
anticipatory politics. Few if any states and polities are agnostic about the future, and the
opacity of the future does not inhibit the serious and concrete imagination and discussing
of it. By presenting the circumstances and challenges of the future in a mode which is
concrete (rather than speculative and probabilistic), and imminently present, the mythic
mode allows the future to be existentially and phenomenologically experienced in a
manner similar to the experience of the temporally and spatially present. This gives to
considerations of the future a gravity and reality which may bear on political decision
rather than simply serving as the object of prediction and estimation. Bear in mind the
scale of futurity 1 intend here is sufficiently large to outstrip the psychological power of
self-regarding or near-and-dear-regarding anticipations of the future, and so
identifications with the future must be in some sense invented rather than natural.
This gravity and concreteness invested in mythic presentations of the future is
important to the sovereign's claim to legitimacy in making decisions regarding the future,
especially when future considerations compete with present ones. I take ecological
stewardship to be paradigmatic of such a tension, with some provisos. First, a somewhat
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idealized case of exploitation vs. stewardship must be supposed, as actual ecological
exploitation is often not even of net benefit to all those affected and so is not a clear
example of reaping present benefits from future costs. Second, the question of
remediability of damage throws a wrench into calculations of cost and benefit; if some
level of degradation can be undone, then there may be an intergenerationally just level of
destructive exploitation, whereas irretrievable losses seem far harder to justify. As noted
in much of the literature on intergenerational justice84 (with echoes of Sorel's "Letter to
Daniel Halevy" prefacing Reflections on Violence), we may identify two camps of
thought on the question of the damage done by progress to posterity, the first optimistic
and the second pessimistic. The first assumes that continued technical progress will
permit damage to be undone in the future, and so a responsibility to the well-being of
future peoples is met by ensuring that they inherit the products and means of further
progress. The second assumes that progress, even when aimed at redressing past damage,
will likely have a negative net impact, and therefore the duty to defend the well-being of
future peoples entails a duty of restraint. The first stance avoids a political dispute over
the balancing ofpresent and future well-being by presupposing the correctness and
beneficence of current behaviour, whereas the second contains an injunction to sacrifice
present interests to future ones.
Because the relatively short history of industrial progress' impacts on ecological
posterity shows a clear negative trend, and the magnitude and scope of the impact grows
along with technical and economic advances, the optimist vs. pessimist question is not
84 See for instance Dieter Bimbacher, "Responsibility for Future Generations - Scope and Limits" in
Handbook oflntergenerationalJustice, Ed. Joerg Chet Tremmel, 26-29
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idle. But to take a stand on it requires a move beyond fact into speculative fiction, and to
act upon such conceptions of the future moves beyond what can be democratically
mandated or scientifically demonstrated.
The myth of progress and the myth of disaster compete for a dominant role in
framing the expectations of the future, those expectations which will inform sovereign
decisions and popular support thereof. In both visions there is a promise to be fulfilled,
and a threat to be avoided. In the optimistic case, the promise is that of increased and
expanded prosperity compatible with a resolution of problems created by prior stages of
progress; the threat is a regress which condemns people as-yet unsaved by progress.
In the pessimistic view the promise is a mitigation or halting of damage done to
future peoples, while the threat is a worsening impact thereon. Add to such an opposition
of view the existentially dire character of some imagined consequences, and these myths
can draw the lines of a fierce battle; perhaps these myths will be constitutive of two
politics of technology such as Schmitt suggested.
In the optimist view, the means of serving present interests and future interest is
the same (continued progress and development), but the pessimist view argues for an
incompatibility between a continued exercise of the means by which present prosperity is
served and responsible care for future peoples' well-being, even future survival in
particularly negative projections. The sovereign authority overseeing decisions which
bear upon both present and future conditions of life (again, ecological exploitation being
the paradigmatic example here) is therefore pulled in two directions. As the preceding
discussion of identifications makes clear, the sovereign is both immediately identified
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with him/her/itself and also, by a mythical unity, with the sovereign whose immediate
responsibility is the care of future peoples who bear the consequences ofpresent
decisions. By discussing a vision of the future as concrete and historically imminent
(even if it will occur far in the future), the sovereign and other political actors can
effectively include a future in the present and disrupt a purely presentisi scheme of
thought and justification. A strong mythic sense of the truth of some future circumstance
aids the sovereign in legitimizing decisions which favour the care of future peoples over
the express desire of present constituents, such as may be thought necessary under a
pessimistic view of the effects of present development.
oc
As Chiara Bottici notes , in this future-regarding mythic discourse takes on the
character of prophecy, and certain manipulations ofmyth seek to make these prophecies
self-fulfilling. To expand this notion, I would add that the creators of myth-as-prophecy
in this respect need not attempt to realize the prophecy itself, but to make real the
conditions and responses which would emerge from the manifestation ofthat myth. Thus
it is not the event itself which they seek to realize, but rather the reaction. It is a
manipulative move to produce a desired reaction to something not yet manifest, and
particularly apt to crafting consent for pre-emptive measures which must be enacted
before the need for such measures is shown to be necessary (where a mandate from
scientific evidence is lacking) or generally accepted (where a mandate from public will is
lacking).
The manipulative and anti-democratic (in the sense of over-riding majority will in
85 "The aim of a political myth is to become a prophecy. Apolitical myth cannot be falsified because it is
not (only) a scientific theory about the constitution of the world, but also (and foremost) the expression
of a determination to act within it."' Bottici, Philosophies of Political Myth", 366
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the interests of future persons not-yet-constitutive of the politically represented people)
character of using mythic grounds for decision are prima facie reasons to challenge its
ethical permissibility. In addressing this problem I would like to clarify the relationship
between myth and lying. The creation and circulation ofmythic narratives is not
necessarily a form of lying, for several reasons. First, mythic discourse need not always
seek to manipulate people towards a particular end; it may simply be used to foster
imaginative thinking or address a desire for collective narrative self-representation.
Where myth is used to manipulate (and this is the case in the applications which are of
interest to this thesis), such manipulation need not be effected by the deliberate
misrepresentation or occlusion of evident facts; myth does not compete with evident truth
when it speaks to matters about which no facts are available. As a discursive mode of
performatively presenting the fictive as factual, myth may be characterized as lying if we
expand the notion of a lie to include such modal shifts, in addition to the more
conventional sense of constative presentations of known falsehoods as truths. To fully
deserve the label of dishonest manipulation, however, myth must be deliberately
deceptive in ways not apparent to its audience. This deception is not a necessary
condition for myth to propagate and to be effective, as its adoption and efficacy does not
depend on a straightforward pretence to constative truth. Myth can be internalized and re-
circulated by an audience which is fully aware of the disconnect between myth's fictive
content and its concrete presentation. Such an ideal case is, however, likely rare in
practice.
In defence of the admittedly manipulative political applications of myth I advance
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the empirical claim that presentisi bias in the conduct of democratic politics (though not
only democratic politics) interferes with a fair balance of present and future
considerations represented in decision-making. This assumption of presentism is
important to the argument, and calls for more justification. Dennis Thompson, in an
article entitled "Representing Future Generations" discusses the existence and the causes
of presentisi bias. He notes that it is not an entirely negative trait, as it provides a measure
of defence against zealotry and ideological excesses which have in the past demanded
great sacrifice from present persons in order to reach some (often historically remote)
goal; however, presentism is vicious in its effects of discounting the interests of future
persons. He lists four main reasons for presentism in representative politics: 1 ) a bias
against deferring rewards; 2) demands that governments be responsive to their
constituents; 3) temporal limits on governmental authority, which encourage the
favouring of short-term results; and 4) a preference for the interests of older living
citizens against those of younger ones in the decisions of government.
John S. Dryzek, in a chapter entitled "Democracy vs. Economic Rationality"88,
discusses public choice theories, modelled on the individual instrumental rationality
supposed in market capitalism, and the distorting effects such rationality has on
democratic culture. His claim is that a reliance on the individual pursuit of self-interest in
politics, rather than aggregating into a rational and effective politics, rather breaks down
into "sub-optimal" competitions of clumped private interests.89 Dryzek's response to this
86 Thompson, "Representing Future Generations", 17.
87 Ibid., 18-20.
88 Dryzek, Democracy in Capitalist Times, 92-1 15.
89 Ibid, 101.
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individual and factional idiocy in politics is to move away from a purely instrumental,
atomism-enforcing individual rationality, to the "activation and institutionalization of
communicative rationality, and the associated conception of democracy as public
deliberation rather than preference aggregation."90 The presentism which I am discussing
can be fairly characterized as a kind of naturally given interest aggregation (those with
interests in using resources at time / are already aggregated at such time), and the
mythical engagement with future communities permits at least a frame of discourse
where a communicative mode can be practised. Even though communication with the
future is not possible, addressing oneself (a public self) to an other in the form of a
fictively fleshed-out future can alter present identification and hopefully counter
tendencies to isolationism and irresponsibility across time.
These are all plausible explanations of what causes decisions to be biased towards
present interests against future (especially distant future) interests, but do not establish
the fact ofpresentisi bias. There is of course a great difficulty in conclusively proving the
existence ofpsychological causes within decision making, especially collective decision
making; I think the fact ofpresentisi bias is obvious enough to be employed without
explicit demonstration (if such demonstration is in fact possible). A manifest, if not
psychologically evident, bias can be equated with an observed disparity in the costs and
benefits of present decisions across generations, and this I believe is abundantly
apparent. To take a few North American examples, chronic deficit spending,
infrastructure underfunding, and deferral of education and health reform all exhibit a (at
least manifest) bias against long-term interests in favour of present stability of
90 Ibid., 115.
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expectations. The psychological fact of selfishness and epistemological tendency to focus
on the most immediately observable information, and the social dynamics of solicitation
and exhortation, all contribute to a psycho-social basis of government which is strongly
susceptible to presentisi tendencies. Beyond these conjectural arguments and appeals to
the intuitive and the obvious, I cannot provide a more solid case for the existence of
presentisi bias in representative government. But I trust my assertion in this matter is not
overly tenuous.
The use of myth is simply a means of allowing future generations of a people,
even if only in the form an imagined fiction, to impose a more affecting presence upon
the conscience of decision makers. In this respect the use of myth to present future
generations of a people concretely does not introduce any new competition to the
presently constituted people's monopoly on power, but simply makes the reasonably
presupposed existence of future generations more conspicuous. The democratic rights of
the present are already abrogated, at least morally, by a duty to posterity, and vividly
illustrating the objects ofthat duty should not be objectionable.
But it is not so benign as that. The sovereign representative has a duty to protect
the posterity of the people and this duty, on a strong conception of sovereign authority,
implies a power to over-ride the expressed will of a particular temporal impersonation of
the people. In times of natural disaster or war, "exceptional circumstances", the
unconditionality of sovereign power allows great latitude in making decisions without
regard for consultation or expressed consent of the represented people. If a disastrous
future is presented as presently and actually imminent (the necessary consequent of some
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action or omission), it may be employed as a pretext for the invocation of exceptional
measures in the present. The potential for abuse for such pre-emptive declarations of
exception is glaring, but this should not discourage a serious engagement with the
question of whether such invocations are ever legitimate.
Because of the scale and scope ofnatural transformation effected by relatively
recently development powers, states (and their subject entities such as corporations) have
the power to drastically alter the conditions of future life before the consequences, and
reversibility of such, are apparent. Other kinds of stewardship of the goods to be inherited
by the future, such as public institutions, financial wealth, laws and infrastructure, are
constructed physically or conventionally by people. As such, they are in a fundamental
sense fungible and modifiable by future generations who also inherit the means by which
this heritage was created. But the ecological heritage was not man-made, and there is
therefore no guarantee that future generations will be able to remedy toxic alterations of
their natural inheritance the way that they may reform bad law or abandon failed
currency. And the consequences of an irretrievably corrupted natural inheritance may be a
matter of survival or extinction. This makes the defence of ecological posterity
existentially important in a way that other kinds ofposterity, while essential to identity,
are not. If present sovereign decisions are made with no consideration for future people
who will bear the consequences of those decisions, and no concomitant means for
recourse, this would seem to be a violation ofbasic democratic principles; those ruled by
the decisions (in the sense of inescapably having their lives conditioned by the effects of
those decisions) are not represented in the making of the decisions. This imposes a
colonial relationship onto the future constituents of a people, wherein their remoteness
makes political exclusion possible.91 The present sovereign authority has two options to
retain democratic legitimacy in this scenario; either "decolonize" the future people by
curtailing those projects which likely or certainly have inescapable consequences for
them, or bring the future into the commonwealth by treating its inhabitants as real in the
discourse of sovereign decision-making. A mythic presentation of the future world as
concrete and actual, not only for discussion by representatives but also for circulation in
public discourse, is, I believe, a means of closing the democratic gap between the present
and the not-yet-present, and adding a certain porosity to each generation's isolation in
time.
91 Note that while the present sovereign is, as discussed earlier in this chapter, mythically identified with
the future sovereign who would rule over the impacted future, the disregard for future interests weakens
the identity with the future popular will by which such sovereignty is legitimized. For a democratically
legitimized sovereign, authority over the future is bound to care for the future.
75
Conclusion
I hope to have given a useful picture of political myth as it has been addressed in
some comers ofWestern thought since Hobbes' early modernity, and to have made a
plausible and persuasive, ifnot convincing, case for the integral place ofmythic thinking
in political action and reflection. As I noted in the introduction, I save till now my
discussion of the moral defensibility of political mythologizing. This is partly to keep
things less complicated, as the preceding three chapters already contain normative issues
aplenty. But it is also because my own assessment of this question is itself quite unsettled.
The chiefmoral problematic of mythical discourse is its power to manipulate, not
only the thinking of "masses" and theoreticians alike, but of the public store of facts upon
which this thinking is grounded. Myth is therefore a powerful tool in the hands of
deceivers and educators, and the moral question is whether the risks of embracing such a
double-edged tool are outweighed by the benefits. On a pessimistic view of popular
rationality, the world can be improved by simply convincing the bulk of a people of the
"right" (true or merely felicitous) ideas, first by reason and then with whatever
supplement is needed to win conviction. Ellul's Propaganda is characterized by a
resignation to this kind of moral calculus; the masses will be manipulated, the truth is
constructed anyway, the good people of the world may as well apply their skill and effort
to winning ideological contests rather than sitting on the sidelines for fear of offending
some Enlightenment ideal ofnoble Reason. He rejects as useless and impossible attempts
for governments to follow public opinion because there is no such identifiable thing to be
found natively, and besides it is too incoherent and uninformed to provide a mandate for
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responsible decision.
It is too easy, for those inclined to a pessimism about public rationality, to simply
take such a defeatist stance (defeatist from the standpoint of seeking a more rational
community to come) and resign themselves to a benevolent paternalist state. Some hope
must be held out, and defended, for a truly transformative shift in democracy which
escapes the monolithic binary relations ofmass and state. Public rationality, though
obstructed and constrained by the political and social conditions of our somewhat archaic
contemporary democracies, still has the potential to outstrip its lacklustre record and
definitively refute arguments that it is better to simply embrace virtuous myths of state.
This argues for seeing myth as at best benign, as providing a coherence and
continuity that escapes fractured public reason, and at worst instrumental to obstructing
the emergence of more fully developed public rationality. But the tension between top-
down vs. bottom-up enlightenment is not always the defining moral question for a polity.
The emergence of crises imposes exigencies on decision and assent that are more
constraining than a hope for the "to-come". The task of gathering support for necessary
measures (a judgement call often opaque to objective evaluation- how great is the danger
of X? How long can a decision be delayed before the imminent arrives?) may pit the
desiderata of liberty and security against each other. The efficacy ofbelief makes mythic
manipulation a tool whose employment cannot be precluded in times of crisis without a
competing argument.
This discussion of the ethical limits to rational and doxastic unconditionality
could continue ad infinitum, but the knot is cut by the existential quality of the most
92 ElIuL Propaganda, 124-125.
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compelling ofmythic discourses, the apocalyptic horizon. My own interest in myth is
rooted in its political orientation towards the total disaster, and the supervenient power
such an orientation has on debates which occur within the territory under existential
threat. If the averting of ecological mass disaster or permanent civilizational collapse
engendered by such disaster is the aim and the content of a political myth, the
"ideological suspension of the ethical" moots discussions ofpermissibility of fictive
public discourse and due respect to public reason. Still, the application of these principles
is remote from my agenda; as with theology, the goal is increased clarity, not agency.
This is said not so much as justification or argument, but rather a confession of
the entanglements which loom behind my treatment ofmyth and politics. The trajectory
of the work I have done thus far leads towards a future study of ecological spirituality and
ecological partisanship as motive forces and identities in politics, and I anticipate these to
be no less ethically ambiguous, and no more philosophically delineated, than the work
which here concludes.
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